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ABSTRACT 
Professional Sport Leagues’ Payroll Mechanisms and Their 
Effect on Competitive Balance 
Aaron Haddad 
Master of Science in Sport Management 
Drexel University, 2010 
 
The purpose of the study was to analyze the effects of 
team payroll mechanisms on competitive balance in the four 
major professional sports including Major League Baseball 
(MLB), the National Basketball Association (NBA), the 
National Football League (NFL), and the National Hockey 
League (NHL).  In analyzing these effects, the purpose was 
(1) to understand the differences between the payroll 
mechanisms of each sport, (2) to determine the effects of 
each payroll mechanism on the competitive balance of the 
respective league, and (3) to describe which aspects of 
each payroll mechanism impact the measured competitive 
balance of the leagues.   
 To analyze the measures of competitive balance, 
secondary data of team winning percentages was compiled.  
These values were broken down into categories based on the 
implementation of various team payroll mechanisms in each 
sport, including the addition of a soft salary cap and 
luxury tax in the NBA, hard salary caps in the NFL and NHL, 
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and a luxury tax and enhanced revenue sharing plan in the 
MLB.  
 Competitive balance was measured on both an intra-
seasonal and inter-seasonal basis.  Intra-seasonal 
competitive balance is the degree of equality of the teams 
in a league during a given season.  This was measured by 
the average ratio of the actual standard deviation in a 
given season and the ideal standard deviation based on the 
Central Limit Theorem.  Inter-seasonal competitive balance 
is the degree of uncertainty across seasons as to the 
playing strength of teams in a given league.  This was 
measured by the average change from season to season in 
winning percentage of the teams in each league.   
 Statistically significant changes in competitive 
balance were shown on an intra-seasonal level across 
multiple leagues based on the type of payroll mechanism 
implemented.  The introduction of the soft salary cap in 
the NBA caused a significant drop in intra-seasonal 
competitive balance, where as hard salary caps in the NFL 
and NHL maintained the levels of competitive balance from 
before implementation.  Luxury taxes in both the NBA and 
MLB showed improvements in intra-seasonal competitive 
balance as well.  Inter-seasonal measures of competitive 
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balance were not shown to be significantly affected by any 
payroll mechanism.          
 While this study focused purely on the effect of 
payroll mechanisms, further research would prove helpful 
taking into account the effects of other factors such as 
team relocation, league expansion, and economic downturns 
in conjunction with these mechanisms.  Also, as a number of 
these payroll mechanisms were introduced recently to their 
respective leagues, a larger set of post implementation 
data could provide more meaningful results. 
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Chapter 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Competitive balance is a central concept in the 
analysis of professional sports leagues.  The change in 
competitive balance over time, especially due to structural 
changes by the leagues, is a commonly researched topic in 
sports management literature (Larsen, Fenn, & Spenner, 
2006).  All four of the major North American professional 
leagues, the National Basketball Association (NBA), 
National Football League (NFL), National Hockey League 
(NHL), and Major League Baseball (MLB), have implemented 
team salary mechanisms over the years in an effort to 
promote competitive balance in their leagues (Kesenne, 
2000).  The overarching goal of the leagues is to lessen 
the revenue gap between large and small market teams.  By 
lowering this gap, small market teams have the ability to 
compete with large market teams for player talent and the 
large market teams do not have the ability to purchase all 
of the high quality.  An even distribution of player talent 
across the teams should lead to games between evenly 
matched teams and greater uncertainty in the outcome of the 
contests. 
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Competitive balance is desired not only for play on 
the field, but also for financial stability of a league and 
its teams.  Neale (1964), in what he called the “league 
standing effect,” explained how competitive balance, or the 
lack thereof, can affect fan interest and league 
attendance.  In a league that lacks competitive balance, 
fan interest in weak teams decreases as these teams 
consistently lose.  As fan interest goes down, attendance 
and revenue for these teams falls as well.  In time, due to 
the lack of uncertainty in outcome of contests, fan 
interest in the consistently successful teams begins to 
fall as well.  Quirk and Fort (1992) detailed this effect 
in showing how the Cleveland Browns began drawing smaller 
crowds during their domination of the NFL in the 1950s.  
The uncertainty of competition has been shown to have an 
effect on keeping fans interested, and therefore, a lack of 
uncertainty is a detriment to the financial success of the 
leagues.             
NEED FOR THE STUDY 
 While previous studies have tried to analyze the 
effects of certain events on the competitive balance in a 
given sport, there has not been a wide variety of research 
done comparing the effects of team payroll mechanisms 
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across all four major professional sports; Major League 
Baseball, the National Basketball Association, the National 
Football League, and the National Hockey League.  All of 
the four major professional sports leagues are set to 
negotiate new collective bargaining agreements (CBAs), with 
their respective CBAs all expiring in 2011, and it is 
believed each league will implement changes to their 
current team payroll structures.  Due to the impending 
changes across the leagues with regards to these payroll 
structures, understanding the differences between each 
system can prove vital to the continued well being of each 
league.    
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of the study was to analyze the effects of 
team payroll mechanisms on competitive balance in the four 
major professional sports of Major League Baseball (MLB), 
the National Basketball Association (NBA), the National 
Football League (NFL), and the National Hockey League 
(NHL).  In analyzing these effects, the purpose was (1) to 
understand the differences between the payroll mechanisms 
of each sport, (2) to determine the effects of each payroll 
mechanism on the given balance of the respective league, 
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and (3) to describe which aspects of each payroll mechanism 
impact the measured competitive balance of the leagues.     
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To determine whether professional team payroll 
mechanisms have an effect on competitive balance in their 
respective leagues, the following research questions were 
proposed. 
1. Do team payroll mechanisms have an effect on 
competitive balance in professional sports? 
2. Is one specific mechanism better at promoting 
competitive balance than others? 
3. What aspects of the payroll mechanisms could be 
contributing to the success or failure in promoting 
competitive balance? 
 
LIMITATIONS 
The following limitations were present in this study: 
1. NHL standings data for the regular season period 
after the implementation of their salary cap has only been 
five years.  Due to this small period of time, changes from 
year to year in this data set produce high variances and 
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cause difficulties in showing statistically significant 
changes when comparing to other sets of data. 
 
DELIMITATIONS 
The following delimitations were present in this 
study: 
1. Other structural changes to leagues have been shown 
to have an effect on their perceived competitive balance, 
including free agency, reverse order entry drafts, and 
changes to the playing schedule or number of teams in the 
league.  The only structural changes analyzed in this study 
are those affecting team salaries, including salary caps, 
luxury taxes, and revenue sharing.  
2. Studies have also shown the effects of competitive 
balance on fan interest and league attendance, including 
work by Neale (1964) and Quick & Fort (1992).  While these 
effects will be mentioned in the study, the extent to which 
competitive balance affects fan interest will not be 
analyzed. 
 
DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Blue Ribbon Panel on Baseball Economics: Formed in 2000 to 
study whether revenue disparities among clubs were 
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seriously damaging competitive balance.  Concluded that 
large and growing revenue disparities existed and were 
causing chronic competitive imbalance. 
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA): Written, legally 
enforceable contract between management of an organization 
and its employees.  This agreement sets down conditions of 
employment, including wages, working conditions, benefits, 
and procedures for dispute resolution.  
Hard Salary Cap:  A limit on the amount of money a team can 
spend on player salaries that cannot be exceeded under any 
circumstances without penalty.  Currently used by the NFL 
and NHL.   
Inter-seasonal Competitive Balance: The degree of 
uncertainty from year to year as to the playing strength of 
teams in a league.    
Intra-seasonal Competitive Balance: The degree of equality 
of teams within a given playing season. 
Luxury Tax:  A surcharge put on the aggregate payroll of a 
team to the extent it exceeds a predetermined level set by 
the league.  Currently used by the NBA and MLB.  
Major League Baseball (MLB): A professional baseball 
organization that operates the National League and American 
League by means of a joint organizational structure since 
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1901.  The league is composed of thirty teams (twenty-nine 
in the United States and one in Canada).    
National Basketball Association (NBA): A professional 
basketball league founded in 1946 which is today composed 
of thirty teams in North America (twenty-nine in the United 
States and one in Canada). 
National Football League (NFL): A professional football 
league founded in 1920 which is today composed of thirty-
two teams in North America. 
National Hockey League (NHL): A professional hockey league 
founded in 1917 which is today composed of thirty teams in 
North America (twenty-four in the United States and six in 
Canada). 
Players Association: The collective bargaining 
representation for current professional athletes in their 
respective leagues. 
Revenue Sharing:  The distribution of pre-determined league 
revenues equally among the teams of the league.  This 
method is predominantly used to lessen the financial gap 
between large market and small market teams.  
Soft Salary Cap: A limit on the amount of money a team can 
spend on player salaries that can be exceeded under certain 
league defined exceptions.  Currently used by the NBA. 
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Chapter 2 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
The purpose of the study was to analyze the effects of 
team payroll mechanisms on competitive balance in the four 
major professional sports of Major League Baseball, the 
National Basketball Association, the National Football 
League, and the National Hockey League.  In analyzing these 
effects, the purpose was (1) to understand the differences 
between the payroll mechanisms of each sport, (2) to 
determine the effects of each payroll mechanism on the 
given balance of the respective league, and (3) to describe 
how these differences across the leagues contribute to the 
outcome of the analysis.   
The review of literature in relationship to this 
research purpose details competitive balance and the 
various team payroll mechanisms of Major League Baseball, 
the National Basketball Association, the National Football 
League, and the National Hockey League.  The section on 
competitive balance will describe the effect of competitive 
balance on fan interest and attendance, the two types of 
competitive imbalance, and the difference between profit-
maximizing and win-maximizing owners.  In depth analysis of 
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the leagues’ current team payroll mechanisms will follow 
detailing both their nuances and reasons for 
implementation.  
FAN INTEREST, ATTENDANCE, AND COMPETITIVE BALANCE 
Competitive balance reflects the uncertainty in 
sporting events.  Neale (1964) called this the “league 
standing effect.”  If a league lacks competitive balance, 
fan interest in weak teams will fall.  As more games are 
played, and the difference between strong and weak teams 
becomes more defined, fan interest in strong teams begins 
to fall due to the lack of uncertainty in outcome.  Quirk 
and Fort (1992) detailed this phenomenon noting the Browns 
began drawing smaller crowds during their domination of the 
NFL in the 1950s.  A loss of fan interest leads to 
declining attendance figures at live events and lower 
ratings during live telecasts of games.  These drops lead 
directly to a loss of revenue for the individual franchises 
and the league as a whole.       
Previous studies have looked at the relationship 
between uncertainty and attendance, both on a single game 
basis and over the league as a whole.  Peel and Thomas 
(1988) studied English football pregame odds data with 
regards to game attendance, finding that the relationship 
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between match attendance and the probability of a home 
victory was U-shaped.  Borland and Lye (1992), in a study 
of Australian football, looked at uncertainty in terms of 
the difference in league standing of the teams 
participating in a given game.  Knowles, Sherony, and 
Haupert (1992) used the same method as Peel and Thomas 
(1988) by considering the betting line as a measure of 
uncertainty in Major League Baseball. Their study of the 
1988 season found that attendance is maximized when the 
probability of the home team winning is 0.6. Rascher (1999) 
studied the 1996 season by looking at a greater number of 
games and variables.  This study showed that fan attendance 
is maximized when the home team’s probability of winning is 
0.66, consistent with Knowles et al. (1992).  These studies 
all showed that uncertainty has a positive effect on demand 
and that a home team will see fan attendance decline as 
their probability of winning increases.  
Schmidt and Berri (2001) looked at the relationship 
between aggregate league attendance and competitive 
balance.  Using time series analysis, as well as panel 
data, they proved that competitive balance has a 
significant impact on attendance at a league level rather 
than just individual contests as in previous studies.  The 
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time series analysis showed that the effect of increased 
competitive balance was positive, although the real change 
in attendance per game was small.  The panel data found 
different relationships based on time period studied.  
Looking at improvements in single year competitive balance, 
fan attendance was impacted negatively.  When looking at 
three and five year periods of increased competitive 
balance, fan attendance became increasingly positive.  
These results demonstrated in any given season, fans prefer 
their teams to be as successful as possible.  However, as 
time goes on, persistent competitive imbalance would be a 
detriment to attendance.  Over the course of multiple 
seasons, a league with low competitive balance would have 
low attendance figures as well.  
When looking at competitive balance in the 
professional sports leagues, it is necessary to understand 
what type of competitive balance is being studied.  Kesenne 
(2004) detailed two types of competitive balance, labeled 
“bad” imbalance and “good” imbalance.  “Bad” imbalance is 
the most common type of competitive imbalance in sports 
leagues, and occurs when few large market teams, with 
strong drawing power and large budgets, hire all the 
talented players and dominate the league.  Leagues with 
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this type of imbalance usually look to revenue sharing as a 
method of distributing money from the large market clubs to 
the small market clubs.  As the financial gap narrows, 
small market teams have more resources to compete with 
large market teams for players and the competitive 
imbalance dissipates.  “Good” imbalance occurs when small 
market clubs, with less financial resources, dominate large 
market clubs on a year to year basis.  This happens much 
less frequently, and Kesenne (2004) argues that this type 
of imbalance does not need to be fixed.  
The effectiveness of revenue sharing in a given league 
depends on the management style of the teams and whether 
they are win maximizing or profit maximizing.  Win 
maximizing teams look to hoard as many players as possible 
to increase their chances of dominating their league.  Cost 
is not an issue as long as the team is successful.  Kesenne 
(2004) showed that revenue sharing will always help 
competitive balance if the small market teams are win 
maximizing, as they will use this extra money to improve 
their teams.  However, in a completely win maximizing 
league, where all teams spend whatever they need to win, 
competitive balance will be at its worst since large market 
teams have more resources than small market teams.  
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In a profit maximizing league, teams sign players up to 
the point where their profit is the greatest.  At some 
point, the cost of signing a new player outweighs the 
benefit in increased win percentage, attendance, or 
revenue.  At this point, a profit maximizing team would 
choose to not sign the player and another team would have 
the opportunity.  In this type of league, revenue sharing 
would not have an effect on competitive balance as teams 
would already be against overspending with a goal of league 
dominance. 
Each of the sports leagues contains teams that are either 
profit or win maximizing.  In the MLB, the Florida Marlins 
have been profit maximizing while the New York Yankees have 
looked to win at all costs.  The NBA has the Los Angeles 
Clippers which have consistently treated the team as a 
business rather than a competitive entity, trading or 
releasing players once they are due to receive increases in 
salary.  Neale (1964) stated that the prayer of a 
perpetually successful team must be, “Oh Lord, make us 
good, but not that good.”  In an ideal league scenario, 
every team looks to put together as strong a team as 
possible so as to increase the probability that they will 
win more games.  However, win maximization in its most 
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literal case can compromise the ability to maximize profit 
due to the fact that this creates a lack of uncertainty in 
outcome and attendance will suffer.     
 
PROFESSIONAL LEAGUE TEAM PAYROLL MECHANISMS 
The four major professional leagues have all 
implemented methods to try and increase competitive balance 
while preserving the financial stability of their teams.  
These methods have included salary caps, luxury taxes, and 
revenue sharing.  Significant collective bargaining has 
taken place between the leagues and their respective 
players’ associations in order to implement these methods, 
involving a significant give and take.  Essential to 
understanding league payroll mechanisms is a detailed 
account of how and why these provisions were put into 
place.  
MLB PAYROLL MECHANISMS 
In 2000, a “blue ribbon” panel commissioned by Major 
League Baseball released a report detailing “large and 
growing revenue disparities” causing “chronic competitive 
imbalance.”  Revenues in the league were growing at a fast 
rate with the top seven teams averaging more than double 
the revenue of the bottom fourteen teams in 1999.  The 
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large revenue increases by the top seven teams led to 
increased player spending, causing the ratio of payroll 
spending from the top seven teams versus the bottom seven 
teams to rise from less than 2-to-1 in the 1980s to 3.5-to-
1 in the 1990s (Levin, Mitchell, Volcker, & Will, 2000).  
Finally, this payroll spending gap led to increasing 
competitive imbalance within the league.  From 1995-1999, 
none of the fourteen teams in the bottom half of team 
payrolls won any of the 158 postseason games played.  In an 
effort to increase competitive balance within the league, 
the report made many recommendations, including a luxury 
tax, significant revenue sharing, and unequal distributions 
of the league’s Central Fund based on team revenue.  Upon 
the instruction of the panel, Major League Baseball 
implemented a few of these recommendations. 
While Major League Baseball does not have a salary 
cap, the league instituted a luxury tax which is referred 
to as the “competitive balance tax” for the 2003 season.  
The recent values of this tax have been $148 million in 
2007, $155 million in 2008, and $162 million in 2009 (Major 
League Baseball [MLB], 2007).  Any team with a final 
payroll over the specified tax thresholds is taxed on the 
difference between the payroll number and the tax 
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threshold.  The tax rate is calculated based upon how many 
consecutive times a team has been above the luxury tax 
threshold.  Teams going over for the first time are taxed 
at a rate of 22.5 percent of every dollar they are above 
the tax threshold.  Two consecutive seasons exceeding the 
threshold raises the tax to thirty percent and exceeding 
three or more times consecutively raises the tax rate to 
the maximum of forty percent.   
As of the 2009 season, only the Boston Red Sox, New 
York Yankees, Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim, and Detroit 
Tigers have paid the luxury tax, with the Red Sox and 
Yankees being the only two to be taxed at the maximum forty 
percent rate for multiple offenses.  The Yankees have paid 
a total of $174 million of the $190 million that has been 
taxed in Major League Baseball since 2003.  The Red Sox 
have paid $13.9 million in tax and the Tigers and Angels 
have paid around $1 million each (Hoch, 2009).  This 
overspending by the Yankees from year to year is one of the 
arguments for a salary cap in Major League Baseball by 
small market teams.  They argue the Yankees consistently 
buy themselves wins each year while pricing out smaller 
market teams for free agents.  However, while the Yankees 
have the highest regular season winning percentage in Major 
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League Baseball since 2003, this has only translated to one 
World Series win.        
The interesting point about this “competitive balance” 
tax is that it is not distributed to small market teams in 
an effort to balance payrolls across the league.  The first 
$2.5 million, or up to $5 million if agreed upon by the 
league and players, is held in reserve by the league for 
any luxury tax refunds.  Seventy-five percent of the 
remaining proceeds are used to fund player benefits, and 
the remaining twenty-five percent is contributed to the 
Industry Growth Fund.  This fund is operated jointly by the 
players and owners with the stated purpose of enhancing fan 
interest, increasing baseball’s popularity, and ensuring 
industry growth into the 21st Century (MLB, 2007).  
While Major League Baseball does not use the luxury 
tax money collected to give back to lower market teams, 
they have instituted a revenue sharing plan that achieves 
this purpose.  Under the current system, agreed upon in 
2007, each team contributes thirty-one percent of their net 
local revenues to a pool that gets redistributed equally 
among all thirty teams each season (Jacobson, 2008).  Local 
net revenues are mostly made up of ticket sales and local 
television contracts, but also include print and radio as 
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well.  While each team gives the same percentage of revenue 
to the fund, teams such as the Yankees, which have their 
own television network, pay a much greater amount of money.  
Last season, the Yankees paid $95 million to the league for 
distribution to smaller market teams like the Florida 
Marlins, Pittsburgh Pirates, and Kansas City Royals.  In 
addition, a percentage of the league’s Central Fund is 
disproportionately allocated to teams based on their 
relative revenues, with lower-revenue teams receiving a 
greater dollar value (Jacobson, 2008).   
While this revenue sharing plan was meant to combat 
the financial disparity between the large and small market 
teams, the league has not historically required small 
market teams to use the money they receive towards 
investing in on-field talent (Castrovince, 2009).  In 2008, 
Forbes reported that from 2002 to 2006, the Kansas City 
Royals’ revenue-sharing payout doubled to $32 million.  In 
the same time period, their player costs increased only six 
percent.  The Marlins also benefitted from the revenue 
sharing plan.  In 2006 and 2007, they received more than 
$60 million in revenue sharing, but their opening day 
payrolls for those two seasons totaled a combined $45.5 
million (Jacobson, 2008).   
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Major League Baseball does not have a team salary 
floor as the other professional leagues do.  The MLB 
enforced minimum player salaries of $390,000 for the 2008 
season and $400,000 for the 2009 season and any team has 
the ability to field a full team at the minimum salary if 
preferred.  The Cleveland Indians received $20 million from 
revenue sharing in 2008, with the Pirates receiving 
approximately $40 million (Madden, 2009).  Even so, both 
teams cut a large amount of their payroll in 2009, citing 
they needed to free up space in order to be more 
competitive in the future.  These teams rely more on 
development of young, inexpensive players rather than 
spending money on big name talent.  The problem with this 
plan is many of these teams let these players go once they 
get good enough to command higher dollar contracts.  While 
some teams, such as the Tampa Bay Rays and Florida Marlins, 
have cultivated this young talent into success, it is often 
short lived once the front office steps in to slash 
payrolls.  The revenue sharing plan, without the protection 
of a salary cap or minimum team salary, is widely said to 
reward poor ownership by allowing teams to pocket the money 
they receive while putting an inferior product on the 
field. 
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NBA PAYROLL MECHANISMS 
In 1982 and 1983 many teams in the NBA were 
experiencing financial difficulties (Ringold, 2000).  Teams 
in smaller revenue markets like Denver, San Diego, and 
Cleveland reported significant losses.  In an effort to 
create a more stable system, the National Basketball 
Players’ Association (NBPA) and NBA adopted the salary cap.  
This cap guaranteed the players a fifty-three percent share 
of revenues from the league.  These “defined gross 
revenues,” or DGR, included local and national television 
revenue, gate receipts, and revenues from the preseason and 
postseason (Conrad, 2006).  The NBA salary cap is 
characterized as soft due to the fact that there are many 
exceptions that allowed for teams to exceed the salary cap 
of fifty-three percent under certain circumstances. This 
type of cap was implemented to promote the ability of 
players to stay with their current teams, since many of the 
exceptions could only be triggered for players that had 
been with the same team for three or more years.  This cap 
also aimed to keep competitive balance in the league by 
reigning in some of the higher spending teams.  During the 
1984-85 season, the first salary cap was set at $3.6 
million per team.  After this agreement was signed, the 
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minimum player salary for the league rose to $40,000 and 
the average player salary approached $275,000 (NBPA, 2009).     
In 1991, the NBPA found out the league had been 
underreporting revenues by excluding luxury box rentals, 
arena signage, and playoff ticket sales when calculated the 
DGR (Conrad, 2006).  Due to the increasing number of luxury 
boxes in arenas, and the numerous uses of signage, the 
players felt this was a necessity to be included.  The 
players and the NBA settled this suit out of court to the 
sum of $60 million.  At this time the average player salary 
rose to $1 million. 
By the 1994-95 season, the salary cap had risen to a 
value of $15.964 million.  In the following offseason, the 
league signed a lucrative television deal with NBC which 
raised the salary cap to $23 million for the 1995-96 
season, a forty-four percent rise from the previous year, 
and a 639 percent increase from the original cap.  In 1994 
the NBA and NBPA negotiated to replace the 1988 CBA.  This 
newly agreed upon contract had many new provisions.   
The DGR was changed to what is now called Basketball 
Related Income, or BRI.  Many factors contribute to the 
calculation of BRI including: 
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• Regular season gate receipts  
• Broadcast rights  
• Exhibition game proceeds  
• Playoff gate receipts  
• Novelty, program and concession sales (at the arena 
and in team-identified stores within proximity of an 
NBA arena)  
• Parking  
• Proceeds from team sponsorships  
• Proceeds from team promotions  
• Arena club revenues  
• Proceeds from summer camps  
• Proceeds from non-NBA basketball tournaments  
• Proceeds from mascot and dance team appearances  
• Proceeds from beverage sale rights  
• 40% of proceeds from arena signage  
• 40% of proceeds from luxury suites  
• 45% - 50% of proceeds from arena naming rights  
• Proceeds from other premium seat licenses  
• Proceeds received by NBA Properties, including 
international television, sponsorships, revenues from 
NBA Entertainment, the All-Star Game, the McDonald's 
Championship and other NBA special events. 
The salary cap exceptions were implemented, including the 
“Larry Bird Exception” that allowed teams to pay whatever 
they wanted in order to keep their existing players.  Also, 
a rookie salary cap was instituted with a graduated scale 
depending on the position a player is drafted, allowing him 
free agency after his third season.  All players were given 
the right to unrestricted free agency when their contracts 
expired.  This contract made the NBA players the most 
highly compensated union with the most liberal free agency 
rules (Kovach & Meserole, 1997).  
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The 1995 CBA contained a clause stating that the league 
could reopen the contract after three years if more than 
51.8 percent of BRI went to player salaries.  This occurred 
in the 1997-98 season, and the NBA owners voted to re-open 
the collective bargaining agreement, claiming losses by 
thirteen teams.  At the time, player salaries had risen to 
fifty-seven percent of BRI and the average salary was $2.36 
million.  The Larry Bird Exception was the primary cause of 
the rise in salaries (Bradley, 1999).  The Larry Bird 
Exception was designed to allow teams to reward their 
superstar players so as to not lose them to another team in 
a bidding war. Instead, owners often overbid on other free 
agents to lure them away from their current teams, staying 
just under the cap, before negotiating with their own 
superstars. Teams’ salary levels exceeded the cap after 
their own superstars were signed to contracts, but this did 
not violate the agreement because of the Bird Exception.  
In most seasons, a majority of teams exceeded the cap.   
Due to the significant rise in salaries as a 
percentage of team revenue over the previous couple of 
years, the owners were looking to roll back the player 
salaries to forty-eight percent of BRI which had been 
agreed upon back in 1995.  The owners also wanted to remove 
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the Larry Bird exception to put a maximum on player 
salaries (Hill & Groothuis, 2001).  There was some division 
between the owners on how strict they wanted to be in 
limiting player salaries.  Lower market teams were in favor 
of a hard cap so they could compete more frequently for 
players as well as increase profitability over time due to 
lower spending.  The higher market teams wanted to control 
spending as well, but a hard cap would increase the odds 
they would lose their star players to free agency.   
The players did not agree to these proposed maximum 
salary changes and the owners imposed a lockout.  The 
lockout lasted until January of 1999 and forced a shortened 
season of fifty games.  The two sides agreed to a deal on 
the last day of negotiations before Commissioner Stern’s 
drop dead date of cancelling the season.  Due to the 
lockout, players lost around $400 million in salaries, 
while over $1 billion was lost in owner, team, and league 
revenues (NBPA, 2009). 
The negotiations in 1999 showed a different goal from 
the NBPA than there had been in previous years.  Previous 
rounds of negotiation were focused on the dissolution of 
the reserve clause allowing players to market their 
services in a free market system.  This caused increases in 
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player movement and increases in team revenue going to the 
player salaries.  The NBPA had previously been unwilling to 
negotiate measures that would affect the internal 
distribution of salaries, instead focusing on trying to get 
as much money as possible for all of the players in the 
league.  The 1999 negotiations focused more on the median 
salary players and trying to decrease the gap between them 
and the higher salaried players (Hill & Groothuis, 2001).     
The new CBA signed in 1999 was a six year deal with an 
owner option to extend for a seventh year.  There are many 
aspects of this deal that favor the median salaried players 
rather than the players with max contracts.  With regards 
to player salaries, the new deal provided maximum annual 
salaries of $9 million for players with zero to six years 
of experience, $11 million for seven to nine years of 
experience, and $14 million for players with ten or more 
years of experience (NBPA, 2009).  The yearly percentage 
increase of salaries also was lowered to ten percent from 
the previous CBA’s twenty percent limit.  Players also 
received guaranteed contracts and the minimum salary was 
increased from a hard limit of $242,000 for rookie players 
and $272,500 for veterans, to a sliding scale that would 
pay veterans of ten or more years $1 million.  Players also 
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agreed to put up to ten percent of their salary in escrow 
that would be refunded to the owners if total league wide 
salaries exceeded fifty-five percent of revenues.  The 
players were awarded with the “mid-level exception” which 
gave more players the opportunity to play for greater than 
the minimum salary.   
The measures put in place by the 1999 CBA did have an 
effect on the distribution of wages between maximum and 
median salaried players.  Between the 1993-1994 and 1997-
1998 seasons, the mean salary of the NBA rose 78.5 percent, 
but the median salary only rose 31.3 percent (Hill & 
Groothuis, 2001).  Many of the median income players saw 
small salary increases while the max players received large 
raises.  In 1999, after the CBA was signed, players signed 
contracts with an average salary $1,529,768, which was less 
than half of the average salary of contracts signed before 
1999.  Part of this can be explained by the fact that year 
to year most of the contracts signed are by rookie and 
journeyman players, which have lower salaries on average 
than star players.  When only looking at contracts signed 
by players with two or more years of experience, however, 
the results are very similar. Average salaries for 
contracts signed in 1999 were $1,935,633, compared to 
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$4,284,542 for contracts signed before 1999 (Hill & 
Groothuis, 2001).  Another confirmation of the effective 
changes of the 1999 CBA was the distribution of wages 
across the lower sixty percent of players.  In the 1993-
1994 season, the lowest sixty percent of the players in the 
league combined to earn 30.1 percent of the income.  This 
number steadily dropped over the years, and in the 1998-
1999 season this number had dropped to 21.6 percent, with 
the top twenty percent of earners getting over fifty-five 
percent of the income.  In the 1999-2000 season, right 
after the new CBA was put in place, the numbers started to 
move in the right direction, as the lower sixty percent of 
players received a bump to over twenty-three percent of 
income (Hill & Groothuis, 2001).         
While the distribution of wages started to change 
across the pool of players, the average player salary and 
percentage of NBA revenue attributed to the players 
continued to rise.  In the 1999-2000 season, salaries 
increased to a total of $1.38 billion, or sixty-two percent 
of revenues.  This represented a forty percent increase to 
what players were receiving in the last year of the 
previous CBA.  Average player salaries in the league rose 
to $3.62 million.  This continued the next season as well, 
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as players’ share of NBA revenues rose to sixty-five 
percent.  During the first three years of the 1999 CBA, 
player compensation was up nearly sixty percent (NBPA, 
2009). 
The 2001-2002 season was the first season the luxury 
tax and escrow came into play.  The luxury tax requires a 
team must pay a one dollar tax for every dollar they spend 
over the luxury tax threshold.  The tax taken from the 
offending teams is totaled and distributed evenly to all 
teams that are under the luxury tax.  This money can also 
be used for various “league purposes” which could include 
investments by the league as a whole in areas like 
international development and their minor league NBDL 
system.   
Since player salaries were far greater than fifty-five 
percent of league wide revenues, ten percent of the player 
salaries were withheld in escrow and split with the owners.  
This had the effect of lowering player salaries by around 
four percent, and bringing player salaries as a whole down 
to a level of fifty-seven percent of BRI.  Even with these 
measures in place, average league salaries continued to 
rise yearly, as total player salaries hovered around the 
fifty-seven to sixty percent mark of BRI.  By the 2003-2004 
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season, the average player salary crossed the $4 million 
mark.    
The 2005 round of negotiations focused on a few key 
issues.  Maximum lengths of player contracts were the first 
contested issue.  The owners wanted to lower this length so 
fewer teams were stuck with guaranteed contracts for 
multiple years after a player’s talent had dwindled (Nance, 
2005).  Annual percentage increases players could receive 
on multi-year contracts were another point of contention.  
Owners wanted this value to be lowered to a more reasonable 
number that mimicked the growth rate of league revenues.  
Players were happy with the current system as it was, but 
were willing to negotiate the levels if they would get 
concessions on the escrow and luxury tax thresholds.  The 
players wanted a smaller percentage of their contracts held 
up in escrow, and they also wanted the percentage of BRI to 
be lifted making it more difficult to reach the triggers 
(Nance, 2005).   
In June of 2005, a new six-year deal was struck 
incorporating many changes.  The players were awarded with 
a few meaningful concessions as part of this agreement.  
The first and most important was that the NBA guaranteed 
the players would receive no less than fifty-seven percent 
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of BRI for their salaries over each year of the new deal 
(National Basketball Association [NBA], 2005).  This was 
the first time a league had guaranteed a percentage of 
revenues to their players in history.  In another 
concession to the players, the salary cap level increased 
from forty-eight percent of BRI to a new level of fifty-one 
percent (Saraceno, 2005).  In addition, all of the existing 
cap exceptions stayed active.  A description of the current 
exceptions can be found in Table 2.1.  The escrow level was 
changed to start at fifty-seven percent of BRI rather than 
the previous fifty-five percent.  As NBA revenues increased 
over time, this level would rise accordingly.  The 
percentage of revenues that were held from players’ 
paychecks for the escrow was also changed to a sliding 
scale.  The first year of the new deal called for ten 
percent to be withheld, years two through five withheld 
nine percent and eight percent was withheld in the sixth 
year.  The luxury tax also stayed the same at sixty-one 
percent of BRI and no additional taxes were levied. 
The owners received some concessions as well.  The 
maximum length of player contracts was reduced by one year  
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on a sliding scale.  Players resigning with their teams now 
had a maximum contract length of six years, and players 
signing with new teams could only sign for a maximum of 
Table 2.1 NBA Salary Cap Exceptions 
  Who Qualifies 
Minimum 
Years 
Maximum 
Years 
Maximum 
Salary 
Maximum 
Raises 
Can be 
split? 
Larry Bird 
Own free 
agent, 3 
seasons 
with same 
team 
 1 6 
Maximum 
salary  10.50% No 
Early Bird 
Own free 
agent, 2 
seasons 
with same 
team 
 2 5 
Greater 
of 175% 
previous 
salary 
or avg 
salary 10.50% No 
Non-Bird 
Own free 
agent, if 
not Larry 
Bird or 
Early 
Bird 1 5 
Greater 
of 120% 
previous 
salary 
or 120% 
minimum 
salary 8% No 
Mid-Level Any 1 5 
Average 
salary 8% Yes 
Rookie 
Team's 
first 
round 
draft 
pick(s) 
2 plus 
two 
team 
options 
2 plus 
two 
team 
options 
120% of 
scale 
amount 
salary 
scale No 
Minimum 
Any 1 2 
Minimum 
salary 
Salary 
always 
minimum No 
Disabled 
Player 
Any 1 5 
Lesser 
of 50%  
injured 
player's 
salary 
or avg. 
salary 8% No 
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five (NBA, 2005).  Also, maximum percentage increases on 
multi-year contracts for players were lowered.  Players 
resigning with their teams now could only receive a maximum 
annual raise of 10.5 percent rather than 12.5 percent, and 
players signing with new teams could only receive eight 
percent increases rather than ten percent in the previous 
CBA (NBA, 2005).     
Taking these factors into consideration, the NBA 
Salary Cap for the 2009-10 season was $57.7 million.  This 
was a decrease from the previous year’s cap for only the 
second time since the cap was implemented.  The luxury tax 
threshold for the 2009-10 season was $69.92 million, down 
from $71.15 million in the previous year (Aldridge, 2009).  
There is also a minimum team salary that is defined as 
seventy five percent of the salary cap each season.  This 
minimum is a requirement for all teams, and teams that do 
reach the minimum are surcharged with the money going back 
to the players (Coon, 2005).   
 
NHL PAYROLL MECHANISMS 
Starting in the 2005-06 season, the NHL instituted a 
hard salary cap on player salaries.  Prior to this season, 
the NHL had been the only North American professional 
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league that had no luxury tax, revenue sharing, or salary 
cap and floor.  The issue of a salary cap came up multiple 
times in the history of the NHL, resulting in lockouts in 
the 1994-95 and 2004-05 seasons.   
The 1994-95 lockout stemmed from the fact that the 
owners wanted a salary cap and the players were opposed.  
Many of the small market teams were struggling financially, 
especially the small market teams in Canada (Deacon & 
Hawaleshka, 1995).  The NHL forced all player salaries to 
be paid in US dollars, and the exchange rate hurt the 
Canadian teams that received their revenue in Canadian 
dollars.  The league was looking to tie player salaries to 
league revenue in order to limit the amount large market 
teams could spend and help the small market clubs.  The 
players, worried that a cap would limit their salary 
potential, proposed revenue sharing as a way for the large 
market teams to subsidize the small market teams.  In the 
end, the 1994-95 lockout shortened the NHL season to forty-
eight games and the teams agreed to donate to a pool to 
lessen the effects of the exchange rate on Canadian teams.  
After this lockout, two of the previously Canadian teams 
relocated, with the Quebec Nordiques becoming the Colorado 
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Avalanche, and the Winnipeg jets becoming the Phoenix 
Coyotes.   
The 2004-05 lockout also revolved around escalating 
player salaries.  The league again wanted a salary cap 
linked to league revenues, with Commissioner Gary Bettman 
referring to this as “cost certainty.”  The league stated 
that the member clubs spent about seventy-five percent of 
revenues on salaries, far greater than any other 
professional league, and lost $273 million in the 2002-03 
season (Farber, 2004).  The league offered solutions 
ranging from a hard salary cap, similar to the NFL, to a 
centralized revenue system like Major League Soccer, but 
the NHL Players’ Association (NHLPA) denied each offer.   
The NHLPA proposed a system including revenue sharing, 
a luxury tax, a one-time five percent rollback in player 
salaries, and reforms to the league's entry level system.  
Bob Goodenow, executive director of the NHLPA, wanted to 
maintain the current free market structure where players 
negotiated their own contracts with the teams and the teams 
were allowed to spend whatever they preferred on players.  
He also disagreed with the league’s portrayal of their 
financial issues, a view that was supported by a November 
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2004 report by Forbes showing that league losses were less 
than half what was claimed by the league (Ozanian, 2004). 
Initial offers by the NHLPA and the league were 
rejected.  The NHLPA offered to increase the one time 
salary rollback from five to twenty-four percent, but the 
league rejected it.  On February 14th, the players offered 
to accept a $52 million salary cap on the condition that it 
was not tied to league revenues.  The league rejected and 
countered with a cap at $42.5 million (Wood, 2005).  On 
February 16th, an agreement could not be reached which led 
to the cancellation of the entire 2004–05 NHL season.  This 
was the first time a North American professional league 
lost a full season due to a labor dispute (Winfree & Fort, 
2008).   
The lockout was resolved when the ownership of the 
league agreed to institute a revenue sharing plan.  The 
revenue sharing plan states that the top ten money-making 
clubs must contribute to a pool that will be distributed 
among teams that are in the bottom fifteen in terms of 
revenue and reside in a market with 2.5 million television 
households or less (National Hockey League [NHL], 2005).  
In turn, the NHLPA agreed to a hard salary cap based 
on league revenues.  Under terms of the 2005 collective 
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bargaining agreement, teams are not permitted to exceed the 
salary cap for any reason other than to replace a player 
with a long term injury, defined as a minimum of twenty-
four days and ten games.  The replacement player’s contract 
must be of equal or lesser value to the injured player, and 
once the injured player is cleared for play, the team must 
find a way to get back under the cap immediately.  The 
cleared player is not allowed to rejoin the team until the 
team creates the necessary cap room.   
The players' share of League revenues is determined to 
be fifty-four percent to the extent League revenues in any 
year are below $2.2 billion; fifty-five percent when League 
revenues are between $2.2 billion and $2.4 billion; fifty-
six percent when League revenues are between $2.4 billion 
and $2.7 billion, and fifty-seven percent when League 
revenues in any year exceed $2.7 billion (NHL, 2005). 
Revenues for the 2005-06 season were projected at $1.8 
billion, setting the salary cap at $39 million.  The 
difference between the salary cap and a team's actual 
payroll is referred to as the teams’ "cap room.”  As 
revenues have risen, the cap has been raised each year to 
its current figure of $56.8 million for the 2009–10 season. 
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The NHL also instituted a salary floor that no team is 
allowed to go under when paying for players. This floor was 
originally set at fifty-five percent of the cap, but is now 
defined to be $16 million below the cap.  In the 2005-06 
season the team salary floor was $21.5 million.  In the 
fifth year since the cap and floor were implemented, the 
floor has risen to $40.8 million, greater than the original 
salary cap back in the inaugural season (NHL, 2005).    
Individual player contracts are also subject to 
maximum and minimum values.  No player can be paid more 
than twenty percent of their team’s cap in a given season.  
In the 2005-06 season this value was $7.8 million and has 
risen to $11.36 million for the 2009-2010 season.  The 
minimum player salary was raised from $180,000 before the 
cap was in place to a value of $450,000 for the 2005-06 
season.  This value has risen each year and is scheduled to 
max out at $525,000 in the 2011-2012 season (NHL, 2005). 
Each year of an NHL player contract, the salary earned 
contributes to their team's cap. On a yearly basis, the 
amount counted against the team’s cap is the player’s 
salary over the life of the contract divided by the number 
of years of the contract.  If a player is signed to a three 
year contract paying him $6 million the first year, $3 
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million the next year, and $6 million the last year, the 
amount counted against the team’s cap would be $5 million 
per year ($15 million divided by three years). This helps 
prevent a team from paying a player different yearly 
amounts in order to load his cap hit into a specific year 
in order to stockpile more players (NHL, 2005). 
The NHL became the first of the major North American 
leagues to implement a hard cap while also granting players 
guaranteed contracts.  While other sports allow teams to 
opt out of their contracts with no financial burden by 
cutting players, the NHL teams may buy-out players’ 
contracts.  In order to buy out a player contract, the 
teams are required to pay a fraction of the remaining 
salary spread over twice the length of the existing 
contract.  A player under the age of twenty-six can be 
bought out for one third of his remaining salary.  Players 
over the age of twenty-six, but under the age of thirty-
five, can be bought out for two thirds of their remaining 
salary.  For example, if a thirty-year-old player was 
bought out with two years and $6 million remaining on his 
contract, the team buying him out would owe him $4 million 
spread evenly over four years.  Players signed over the age 
of thirty-five cannot be bought out and are entitled to 
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their entire contracted pay.  The average yearly value of 
this contract would count against the buying out team’s 
salary cap for all years off the deal, even if the player 
retires before the contract is up (NHL, 2005). 
In order to keep the salary cap system viable, the NHL 
instituted financial penalties to make sure high revenue 
producing teams don’t try to underreport their revenues or 
circumvent the salary cap.  All team revenue reports are 
audited on a yearly basis and teams found to be 
underreporting revenue are fined $1 million plus the amount 
misreported for their first offense.  Subsequent offenses 
by a team are subject to $5 million fines and double the 
amount misreported.  Teams are also not allowed to go 
around the cap by giving players gifts, side deals, 
redirected money through corporate entities, or other 
marketing and promotion contracts (NHL, 2005). 
In another effort to keep high revenue teams from 
trying to circumvent the salary cap, trading cash for 
players or paying a player's remaining salary after trading 
him were banned.  Any players, agents or employees found to 
have violated the cap face fines up to $1 million and/or 
suspension. Teams found to have violated the cap face fines 
of up to $5 million, and the potential for lost draft 
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picks, lost points in the standings, or forfeited games 
(NHL, 2005). 
NFL PAYROLL MECHANISMS 
Labor relations between the NFL Players’ Association 
and the league were tenuous leading up to the 
implementation of the salary cap in the 1994-95 season.  
The NFL Players’ Association (NFLPA) was formed in 1956.  
Initially the NFL did not recognize the union, but the 
Supreme Court ruled that due to the lack of antitrust 
exemptions for football, the union was a valid negotiating 
party.  The first collective bargaining agreement was not 
agreed upon until 1968, after a two week player strike. 
Every subsequent contract negotiation from this point to 
the implementation of the salary cap in the 1994-95 season 
involved the players staging a walkout or strike (Kovach, 
1990). 
While other leagues had used this tactic successfully, 
the NFL owners won concessions during bargaining as well as 
in court battles.  In 1982, the NFLPA submitted a proposal 
to the NFL calling for players to be paid fifty-five 
percent of league wide revenue, putting them in line with 
player salaries in baseball and basketball.  The owners did 
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not accept this proposal as it would have doubled their 
expenses.  The resulting player strike lasted fifty-seven 
days and resulted in a contract with no significant added 
benefits for the players.   
In 1987, upon completion of the 1982 agreement, the 
NFLPA tried to loosen free agency restrictions rather than 
ask for a guaranteed percentage of revenue.  Negotiations 
yielded no agreement, and the resulting player strike was 
broken after twenty-four days when the owners used 
replacement players.  After this strike ended, the NFLPA 
filed an antitrust lawsuit against the league in Powell v. 
NFL.  The district court found that the NFLPA was looking 
to “gain through the courts what they could not win at the 
bargaining table (Roman, 1990).”  The courts also felt that 
enjoining implementation of player reserve systems could 
hurt league competitive balance and in turn fan interest.  
The court stated that due to the existence of the NHLPA, 
and negotiated agreements in the past, the current system 
could not be challenged under antitrust law (Lock, 1990).  
In response to this ruling, the NFLPA decertified to again 
challenge under antitrust law.  Once the NFLPA was 
decertified, the courts sided with the players on a number 
of cases.  A settlement was negotiated between the players 
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and the league resulting in player free agency and the 
salary cap as it stands today. 
Starting in the 1994-95 season, the NFL instituted a 
hard salary cap on player salaries.  The NFL salary cap was 
based on what the league termed “Defined Gross Revenues,” 
or DGR.  The most substantial items in the DGR were the 
national and local television and radio contracts, as well 
as ticket and merchandise sales.   What DGR didn't include 
was local revenue, which includes sponsorships like stadium 
naming rights. However, those local revenue streams are now 
included in the salary cap pool, called Total Revenue (TR).  
Total Revenues include:  
1) Regular season, preseason, and postseason gate 
receipts, including ticket revenue from luxury boxes, 
suites, and premium seating.    
2) Proceeds from the broadcast of these games on radio or 
television including network, local, cable, pay 
channel, satellite, international, and delayed 
broadcasts. 
3) Revenues derived from concessions, parking, local 
advertising and promotion, signage, magazine 
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advertising, local sponsorship agreements, stadium 
clubs (National Football League [NFL], 2006). 
The first NFL salary cap in 1994 was $34.6 million.  This 
was calculated as sixty-three percent of DGR.  As league 
revenues increased, the value of the salary cap rose as 
well.  When the NFL changed to the total revenue model 
under the new collective bargaining agreement in 2006, the 
percentage of revenue went down to fifty-seven percent.  
However, since a greater amount of revenue was included in 
the model, this smaller percentage translated to greater 
dollar values.  Under the original DGR model, the salary 
cap was set at $94.5 Million in 2006 with the players 
receiving 64.5 percent of the DGR. Under the expanded total 
revenue system, the cap increased to $102 million with the 
players receiving fifty-seven percent of the total revenue, 
an increase of almost eight percent in actual dollars.  The 
salary cap for the 2009 season was $128 million (NFL, 
2006).      
In any league year where the salary cap is in effect, 
there is a guaranteed league wide salary of fifty percent 
total revenues.  If player costs, for any reason, end up 
being less than fifty percent for a given year, then the 
NFL is required to pay the discrepancy directly to the 
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players in the following season.  While the salary cap is 
determined by a percentage of total league revenues, the 
actual dollar amount of the cap in any given season shall 
not be lower than the actual dollar amount of the cap from 
the preceding year. If league revenues were to go down, 
players would receive a greater percentage to maintain 
previous salary levels.  However, the percentage of revenue 
that players can receive for benefits and salaries can 
never be greater than 61.68 percent of total league revenue 
(NFL, 2006).      
The NFL also implemented minimum team salary levels as a 
concession to the players.  Starting in the 2006 season, 
the minimum team salary was defined as eighty-four percent 
of the salary cap.  Each year, the minimum team salary has 
risen 1.2 percent to a value of 87.6 percent in the 2009 
season.  Teams that do not pay their players the minimum 
team salary in a given season are required to pay any 
shortfall amount to their players the next season (NFL, 
2006).      
No contract in the NFL is guaranteed. If a player gets 
injured, falls out of favor with management, starts to play 
poorly, or is a detriment to the team in any way, the team 
can release him at any time.   Many teams use a technique 
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called back-loading when negotiating player contracts.  A 
back-loaded contract is one that has the salary increase 
significantly in the latter years of the contract.  For 
example, a player may sign a five year, $40 million 
contract that pays out $4 million in year one, $6 million 
in year two, $8 million in year three, $10 million in year 
four, and $12 million in year five.  In many situations 
players will be cut or contracts will be renegotiated 
before these high salary numbers go into effect, thus 
making the contracts much smaller than they seem at first 
glance (NFL, 2006).         
While player contracts are not guaranteed, signing 
bonuses are guaranteed and prorated over the length of the 
contract on a straight line basis.  The max allowed 
proration is six years.  Any player removed from a team’s 
roster on or before June 1 in any league year will have the 
remaining signing bonus amount accelerated to count towards 
the salary cap in that league year.  Players removed after 
June 1 will have the remaining portion of their bonus count 
towards the cap in the following league year.  Players 
traded to a new team will have their bonus count only on 
their old team’s cap, not the new team (NFL, 2006).      
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An article was added to the Agreement stating that if 
either the NFL Players’ Association or the owners are 
unhappy with the updated CBA, they may elect to make it 
null and void after four years.  This article of the CBA 
was triggered after the 2009 season, thus making the 2010 
season an uncapped year in the NFL. 
SUMMARY 
In summary, this review of relevant literature 
included an in-depth review of the critical areas impacting 
this study.  Competitive balance in professional sports was 
reviewed, specifically detailing its effect on fan interest 
and attendance, the two types of competitive imbalance, and 
the win or profit maximizing management styles.  The 
various team payroll mechanisms of Major League Baseball, 
the National Basketball Association, the National Football 
League, and the National Hockey League were analyzed to 
specify the reasons for implementation and nuances of each 
structure.  
While previous studies have detailed the effects of 
structural changes on competitive balance in professional 
sports, a gap exists in comparing the effects of league 
payroll mechanisms across the four major professional 
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sports.  Whether hard or soft salary caps, luxury taxes, or 
revenue sharing, each league has developed a payroll system 
in an effort to constrain player salaries and promote 
competitive balance.  The nuances of each league’s payroll 
mechanisms provide an opportunity for the purpose of this 
study; to determine which mechanisms have an effect on 
competitive balance and what aspects of each bring about 
this effect.    
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The purpose of the study was to analyze the effects of 
team payroll mechanisms on competitive balance in the four 
major professional sports.  In analyzing these effects, the 
purpose was (1) to understand the differences between the 
payroll mechanisms of each sport, (2) determine the effects 
of each payroll mechanism on the given balance of the 
respective league, and (3) to describe which aspects of 
each payroll mechanism impact the measured competitive 
balance of the leagues.   
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research design for this study was a quantitative 
design using secondary data of winning percentages from the 
four major professional sports leagues.  The information 
necessary for this study was best gathered through this 
type of research design.  Other data collection methods, 
including interviews with league front office personnel and 
league salary cap experts, were deemed not suitable due to 
the fact that secondary data was already readily available 
from multiple sources.  For information regarding the final 
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regular-season standings of Major League Baseball (MLB), 
National Basketball Association (NBA), National Hockey 
League (NHL), and National Football League (NFL) teams, the 
websites Baseball-Reference.com, Basketball-Reference.com, 
Hockey-Reference.com, and Pro-Football-Reference.com were 
used. To verify the accuracy of the information provided on 
these sites, the official websites of each league were 
used. 
CURRENT RESEARCH 
Two measurements of parity were adopted in this 
analysis to determine the change in competitive balance 
after implementation of league payroll mechanisms.  The 
first measure looks at the intra-season competitive balance 
of each league.  One method of measuring intra-season 
parity is to look at the dispersion of winning percentages 
of the teams in the league.  The standard deviation of 
winning percentages measures this dispersion.  Due to the 
fact that standard deviation of winning percentages depends 
on the number of games played in a season, it is necessary 
to standardize the deviations by the number of games 
played.  By standardizing this value, it is possible to 
compare the change in standard deviation over time in a 
given league, since some leagues have changed the number of 
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games each team plays in a season, as well as compare 
across leagues that play a different number of games per 
season.         
In a completely balanced league, all teams have a 
fifty percent chance of winning a given contest.  In this 
scenario, the outcome of each game would be the same as the 
outcome of flipping a coin.  As the number of flips (games) 
increases, the value of the observed percentage of wins 
(heads) or losses (tails) would approach the expected mean 
value of fifty percent.  The Central Limit Theorem can be 
used to predict the standard deviation in this scenario 
depending on the number of games played.  If every team has 
the same chance of winning the equation for standard 
deviation would be: std= .50/√n where n equals the number 
of games played per team.  In the NFL the ideal standard 
deviation would be .50/√16=.0125, the NBA and NHL would be 
.50/√82=0.00552, and the MLB would be .50/√162=0.0392.  As 
the number of games increases, the ideal standard deviation 
of a league decreases.  To compare the observed standard 
deviation of winning percentages in each league year to the 
ideal standard deviation above, a ratio of actual to ideal 
standard deviations was formulated.  Comparing these ratios 
over time will show whether the implementation of team 
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salary mechanisms in each league had an effect on intra-
season competitive balance.      
The second measure of parity adopted looks at the 
inter-season parity of each league.  If teams had the same 
success year after year, many teams would know going into 
the season they had no chance of winning.  Additionally, 
the importance of a given game would be very low and fan 
interest and attendance would decline due to lack of 
uncertainty in outcome.  To measure the inter-season 
competitive balance of each league, the change in winning 
percentage of each team from year to year was calculated.  
As the direction of the change does not matter, the 
absolute value of the change was used.  Summing up these 
absolute winning percentage changes each year gives a data 
point showing the change in winning percentage of the 
entire league.  As leagues have expanded over the years, 
the number of teams in each league has grown.  To account 
for these changes, the sum of the winning percentages was 
divided by the number of teams to get an average value.  A 
greater average value would mean greater fluctuation in 
winning percentages of the teams in each league and thus 
greater uncertainty.  Comparing these ratios over time will 
show whether the implementation of team salary mechanisms 
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in each league had an effect on inter-season competitive 
balance.        
SUMMARY 
 The quantitative analysis of secondary league 
standings data gave the researcher the necessary 
information to fulfill the purpose of this study: (1) to 
understand the differences between the payroll mechanisms 
of each sport, (2) determine the effects of each payroll 
mechanism on the given balance of the respective league, 
and (3) to describe how these differences across the 
leagues contribute to the outcome of the analysis.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The purpose of the study was to analyze the effects of 
team payroll mechanisms on competitive balance in the four 
major professional sports.  In analyzing these effects, the 
purpose was (1) to understand the differences between the 
payroll mechanisms of each sport, (2) determine the effects 
of each payroll mechanism on the given balance of the 
respective league, and (3) to describe which aspects of 
each payroll mechanism impact the measured competitive 
balance of the leagues. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 The research questions for this study were the 
following: 
1. Do team payroll mechanisms have an effect on 
competitive balance in professional sports? 
2. Is one specific mechanism better at promoting 
competitive balance than others? 
3. What aspects of the payroll mechanisms could be 
contributing to the success or failure in 
promoting competitive balance? 
 
54 
 
 
 
COMPETITIVE BALANCE 
 To evaluate the level of competitive balance in the 
four professional leagues, two methods of calculation were 
used.  To determine the level of intra-season competitive 
balance, competitive balance within a given season, a ratio 
of actual and ideal standard deviation of winning 
percentages was used.  This ratio allows comparison not 
only between individual seasons in each league, but also 
across different leagues over a given timeframe.  Inter-
season competitive balance, competitive balance from season 
to season, was determined by summing the change in winning 
percentage from year to year for each league.  
The change in ratio of standard deviation of winning 
percentages of the four leagues for the time frames 
previously specified is shown in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1.  
Of the four leagues, the NBA has the highest average ratio 
of 2.732.  This ratio is higher than the other three 
professional leagues and the difference is statistically 
significant across all leagues at the .01 level.  The NFL 
has the lowest average ratio of 1.507.  This ratio is lower 
than the other three professional leagues, and this 
difference is also statistically significant across all 
leagues at the .01 level.  The NHL and MLB have average 
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ratios of 1.702 and 1.760 respectively.  When comparing 
against each other, the difference is not statistically 
significant.  
Table 4.1 Ratio of Actual to Ideal Standard Deviation of Winning % 
Season NBA NFL NHL MLB 
1971 2.6402       
1972 3.3852       
1973 3.5863       
1974 2.4137       
1975 2.1315       
1976 1.9058       
1977 1.7808       
1978 2.0167 1.5936     
1979 1.8738 1.3793     
1980 2.7552 1.3945     
1981 2.9089 1.4957     
1982 2.7662 1.3895     
1983 2.9211 1.2807     
1984 2.0752 1.3959     
1985 2.6485 1.6823     
1986 2.6020 1.5695     
1987 2.7970 1.6691     
1988 2.8524 1.3529     
1989 2.9380 1.3449     
1990 3.1510 1.4413   1.4221 
1991 2.8634 1.6213   1.5198 
1992 2.8883 1.7425   1.6097 
1993 2.8691 1.6561   1.9090 
1994 3.2102 1.2835   1.4586 
1995 2.9214 1.4012 1.5406 1.7011 
1996 3.1019 1.2249 2.0923 1.5748 
1997 3.4578 1.4736 1.4115 1.5091 
1998 3.4310 1.4540 1.7419 2.1212 
1999 2.2526 1.7117 1.3641 1.9419 
2000 2.9156 1.4950 1.9488 1.5712 
2001 2.8463 1.5755 2.0078 2.0492 
2002 2.4994 1.6276 1.6905 2.3285 
2003 2.6116 1.3211 1.8001 2.1027 
2004 2.4646 1.5340 1.7833 2.1201 
2005 2.8031 1.5400 N/A 1.6979 
2006 2.4689 1.6951 1.9789 1.5842 
2007 2.3957 1.4480 1.8524 1.4563 
2008 3.0563 1.6607 1.1929 1.7362 
2009 3.1174 1.6577 1.5863 1.7929 
2010 2.9513 1.6115 1.5433   
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Figure 4.1 Ratio of Actual to Ideal Standard Deviation of Winning %  
 
 
Looking at the average change in winning percentage 
from season to season across the four leagues provides a 
slightly different picture.  This inter-seasonal change is 
shown in Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2.  As was the case in the 
intra-seasonal data, the NFL has the highest level of 
competitive balance of the four professional leagues with 
an average winning percentage change of .1683.  This 
difference is significant against all leagues at the .01 
level.  The NBA, which had the worst level of intra-
seasonal competitive balance, had the second highest level 
of inter-seasonal balance with an average winning 
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percentage change of .0980.  Comparing to the NHL and MLB, 
the difference in average is significant at the .01 level.  
The MLB and NHL, which did not show a significant 
Table 4.2 Average Change in Winning % 
Season NBA NFL NHL MLB 
1972 0.0961       
1973 0.1105       
1974 0.0974       
1975 0.1135       
1976 0.0909       
1977 0.0989       
1978 0.0855       
1979 0.1052 0.1522     
1980 0.1064 0.1026     
1981 0.0964 0.1673     
1982 0.1155 0.2055     
1983 0.0923 0.1743     
1984 0.0858 0.1520     
1985 0.0923 0.1540     
1986 0.0456 0.1295     
1987 0.0987 0.1295     
1988 0.0828 0.1838     
1989 0.1129 0.1434     
1990 0.1015 0.1518     
1991 0.0758 0.1541   0.0586 
1992 0.1039 0.1919   0.0587 
1993 0.0895 0.2054   0.0778 
1994 0.0813 0.1519   0.0615 
1995 0.1021 0.1293   0.0644 
1996 0.0896 0.1450 0.0565 0.0528 
1997 0.1118 0.1376 0.0816 0.0554 
1998 0.1220 0.1667 0.0689 0.0627 
1999 0.1296 0.1541 0.0565 0.0535 
2000 0.0862 0.2167 0.0544 0.0587 
2001 0.0706 0.1735 0.0649 0.0572 
2002 0.1001 0.2097 0.0675 0.0544 
2003 0.0740 0.1592 0.0809 0.0451 
2004 0.1070 0.1953 0.0732 0.0667 
2005 0.1409 0.1719   0.0485 
2006 0.0992 0.2188   0.0500 
2007 0.0943 0.2032 0.0748 0.0503 
2008 0.1122 0.2031 0.0707 0.0572 
2009 0.1033 0.2013 0.0585 0.0579 
2010 0.1010 0.1524 0.0740   
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Figure 4.2 Average Change in Winning % 
 
difference between their two leagues with regards to intra-
seasonal balance, were significantly different at the .01 
level.  The NHL had an average winning percentage change of 
.0679, while the MLB had the lowest level of inter-seasonal 
balance with an average of .0574.       
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE 
For the NFL, the timeframe of this study was from the 
1977-78 season to the 2009-2010 season.  The analysis 
starts in the 1977-78 season due to the fact that the NFL 
changed their scheduling procedures starting with that 
season, requiring teams with better records from the 
previous season to play each other more often.  The league 
scheduled less successful teams from the following year to 
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play each other as well.  This rule change could have 
potentially inflated the competitive balance, so data from 
prior seasons was omitted.  The change in ratio of standard 
deviation of winning percentages of the NFL during this 
time period is shown in Table 4.3 and Figure 4.3.   
Table 4. 3 NFL Ratio of Actual to Ideal Standard Deviation of Winning %  
Season Actual Std. Dev. Ideal Std. Dev. Ratio of Actual/Ideal 
1978 0.2129 0.1336 1.5936 
1979 0.1724 0.1250 1.3793 
1980 0.1743 0.1250 1.3945 
1981 0.1870 0.1250 1.4957 
1982 0.1737 0.1250 1.3895 
1983 0.2135 0.1667 1.2807 
1984 0.1745 0.1250 1.3959 
1985 0.2103 0.1250 1.6823 
1986 0.1962 0.1250 1.5695 
1987 0.2086 0.1250 1.6691 
1988 0.1747 0.1291 1.3529 
1989 0.1681 0.1250 1.3449 
1990 0.1802 0.1250 1.4413 
1991 0.2027 0.1250 1.6213 
1992 0.2178 0.1250 1.7425 
1993 0.2070 0.1250 1.6561 
1994 0.1604 0.1250 1.2835 
1995 0.1751 0.1250 1.4012 
1996 0.1531 0.1250 1.2249 
1997 0.1842 0.1250 1.4736 
1998 0.1817 0.1250 1.4540 
1999 0.2140 0.1250 1.7117 
2000 0.1869 0.1250 1.4950 
2001 0.1969 0.1250 1.5755 
2002 0.2035 0.1250 1.6276 
2003 0.1651 0.1250 1.3211 
2004 0.1918 0.1250 1.5340 
2005 0.1925 0.1250 1.5400 
2006 0.2119 0.1250 1.6951 
2007 0.1810 0.1250 1.4480 
2008 0.2076 0.1250 1.6607 
2009 0.2072 0.1250 1.6577 
2010 0.2014 0.1250 1.6115 
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Figure 4.3 NFL Ratio of Actual to Ideal Standard Deviation of Winning % 
 
 
For purposes of this analysis, the NFL season data was 
split up into two sections.  The 1977-78 to 1992-93 season 
data represents the NFL before implementation of free 
agency the salary cap.  The 1994-95 to 2009-2010 season 
data represents the league after free agency and the salary 
cap were implemented.  The 1993-94 season was omitted from 
analysis as it was a year that had free agency but no 
salary cap.  
 During the period from the 1977-78 season to the 1992-
93 season, the average ratio was 1.5006 with a variance of 
.0213, while the period from 1994-95 season to the present 
had an average ratio of 1.5270 with a variance of .0188.  
While the value for the most recent set of data is higher, 
the difference between the two averages of .0264 is not 
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significant at the .05 level.  The fact that there was no 
competitive balance change in the NFL after implementation 
of the hard salary cap is not surprising.  The NFL, before 
implementation, was already the most competitively balanced 
league of the four professional leagues.  The goal of the 
salary cap was to maintain the high level of competitive 
balance while constraining owners from over spending on 
players due to the introduction of free agency.  The fact 
that there has not been a significant change in competitive 
balance shows that the NFL was able to achieve that goal.   
 Looking at the inter-seasonal competitive balance 
measure of average change in winning percentages over the 
same period confirms the above findings.  These changes are 
shown in Table 4.4 and Figure 4.4.  Since the 1993-94 
season was an anomaly year with free agency and no salary 
cap, the changes from the 1992-93 to 1993-94 season and 
1993-94 to 1994-95 season are omitted. 
During the period from the 1977-78 season to the 1992-
93 season, the average change in winning percentage from 
season to season was .1598 with a variance of .0008, while 
the period from 1994-95 season to the present had an 
average change in winning percentage of .1806 with a 
variance of .0008.  While the value for the most recent set 
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of data is higher, the difference between the two averages 
of .0208 is not significant at the .05 level.  However, the 
NFL showed average changes in winning percentage above .2 
for four consecutive years from 2005 to 2009 before a drop 
in the most recent season.  This was the first time this  
Table 4.4 NFL Average Change in Winning % 
Season Average Change in Winning % 
1979 0.1522 
1980 0.1026 
1981 0.1673 
1982 0.2055 
1983 0.1743 
1984 0.1520 
1985 0.1540 
1986 0.1295 
1987 0.1295 
1988 0.1838 
1989 0.1434 
1990 0.1518 
1991 0.1541 
1992 0.1919 
1993 0.2054 
1994 0.1519 
1995 0.1293 
1996 0.1450 
1997 0.1376 
1998 0.1667 
1999 0.1541 
2000 0.2167 
2001 0.1735 
2002 0.2097 
2003 0.1592 
2004 0.1953 
2005 0.1719 
2006 0.2188 
2007 0.2032 
2008 0.2031 
2009 0.2013 
2010 0.1524 
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Figure 4.4 NFL Average Change in Winning % 
 
level had been reached in consecutive seasons across this 
set of data.  Before the drop in winning percentage change 
in the most current season, the two data sets would have 
been significantly different at a .05 level.  This higher 
level of winning percentage change in the most recent data 
set shows that not only did the salary cap slightly improve 
intra-seasonal competitive balance, but it more greatly 
improved inter-seasonal competitive balance as well.         
NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE 
The NHL data ranges from the 1994-95 to 2009-10 season 
and is split up into two sections.  The 1994-95 to 2003-
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2004 season data represents the NHL before implementation 
of the salary cap.  The 2005-06 to 2009-2010 season data 
represents the league after their salary cap was 
implemented.   
Starting in the 1999-00 season, the NHL began giving a 
point in the standings to teams that lost in overtime.  
Thus, overtime games gave out a total of three points, two 
for the winner and one for the loser, versus the regular 
two points in a non-overtime game.  Due to the fact that 
the measure of winning percentage used in this analysis is 
the number of points scored in a season divided by the most 
possible points a team can score in a season, it is 
necessary to remove this added point so as not to have 
inflated values.  For the sake of this analysis, from the 
1999-00 season onward, all overtime losses will be counted 
as regular losses and the losing team will be awarded no 
points.  The change in ratio of standard deviation of 
winning percentages of the NFL during this time period is 
shown in Table 4.5 and Figure 4.5.   
During the period from the 1994-95 season to the 2003-
04 season, the average ratio was 1.7381 with a variance of 
.0596, while the period from 2005-06 season to the present 
had an average ratio of 1.6308 with a variance of .0929.  
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While the value for the most recent set of data is lower, 
the difference between the two averages of .1073 is not 
significant at the .05 level.  The NHL, like the NFL, has 
shown a high level of intra-seasonal competitive balance 
throughout the years studied in this analysis.  The 
implementation of the hard salary cap had a positive effect 
on intra-seasonal competitive balance, but more years of 
study are necessary in order to determine whether this will 
be significant.  
Table 4.5 NHL Ratio of Actual to Ideal Standard Deviation of Winning % 
Season Actual Std. Dev. Ideal Std. Dev. Ratio of Actual/Ideal 
1989 0.0972 0.0559 1.7385 
1990 0.0942 0.0559 1.6860 
1991 0.1044 0.0559 1.8678 
1992 0.0959 0.0559 1.7162 
1993 0.1451 0.0546 2.6604 
1994 0.1023 0.0546 1.8749 
1995 0.1112 0.0722 1.5406 
1996 0.1155 0.0552 2.0923 
1997 0.0779 0.0552 1.4115 
1998 0.0962 0.0552 1.7419 
1999 0.0965 0.0707 1.3641 
2000 0.1076 0.0552 1.9488 
2001 0.1109 0.0552 2.0078 
2002 0.0933 0.0552 1.6905 
2003 0.0994 0.0552 1.8001 
2004 0.0985 0.0552 1.7833 
2006 0.1093 0.0552 1.9789 
2007 0.1023 0.0552 1.8524 
2008 0.0659 0.0552 1.1929 
2009 0.0876 0.0552 1.5863 
2010 0.0852 0.0552 1.5433 
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Figure 4.5 NHL Ratio of Actual to Ideal Standard Deviation of Winning % 
    
Inter-seasonal competitive balance measures are 
inconclusive with regards to the NHL data.  The average 
change in winning percentage is shown in Table 4.6 and 
Figure 4.6.  During the period from the 1994-95 season to 
the 2003-04 season, the average change in winning 
percentage was .0672 with a variance of .0001, while the 
period from 2005-06 season to the present had an average 
ratio of .0695 with a variance of .0001.  This change is 
not significant at the .05 level.  As was the case in the 
intra-seasonal analysis, the implementation of the hard 
salary cap did not change the level of inter-seasonal 
balance in the NHL.  However, further analysis once more 
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seasons have been completed could yield more significant 
results.  
Table 4 6 NHL Average Change in Winning % 
Season Average Change in Winning % 
1990 0.0857 
1991 0.0679 
1992 0.0824 
1993 0.0794 
1994 0.0858 
1995 0.0702 
1996 0.0565 
1997 0.0816 
1998 0.0689 
1999 0.0565 
2000 0.0544 
2001 0.0649 
2002 0.0675 
2003 0.0809 
2004 0.0732 
2007 0.0748 
2008 0.0707 
2009 0.0585 
2010 0.0740 
    
Figure 4.6 NHL Average Change in Winning %  
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NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION 
The NBA data ranges from the 1970-71 season to the 
2009-2010 season.  The change in ratio of standard 
deviation of winning percentages of the NBA during this 
time period is shown in Table 4.7 and Figure 4.7.  Using 
the 1970-71 season, the first NBA season with the teams 
split up into two conferences, allows for three similarly 
sized data sets of analysis.  
The 1970-71 to 1983-84 season data represents the 
league before implementation of the salary cap.  The 1984-
85 to 1997-98 season data represents the league under a 
salary cap but before the luxury tax was implemented.  
Finally, the 1998-99 to 2009-10 season data represents the 
league under both a salary cap and luxury tax.  While the 
luxury tax was agreed upon in the league’s 1998-99 
collective bargaining, the first year it took effect was 
the 2002-03 season.  However, due to the fact that the 
teams understood that the luxury tax penalty would begin to 
take effect if total player salaries and benefits went 
above the 61.1 percent BRI threshold, the disincentive to 
spend began during the 1998-99 season. The 1998-99 season 
will be used as the starting date for the luxury tax in 
this analysis. 
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Table 4.7 NBA Ratio of Actual to Ideal Standard Deviation of Winning % 
Season Actual Std. Dev. Ideal Std. Dev. Ratio of Actual/Ideal 
1971 0.1458 0.0552 2.6402 
1972 0.1869 0.0552 3.3852 
1973 0.1980 0.0552 3.5863 
1974 0.1333 0.0552 2.4137 
1975 0.1177 0.0552 2.1315 
1976 0.1052 0.0552 1.9058 
1977 0.0983 0.0552 1.7808 
1978 0.1114 0.0552 2.0167 
1979 0.1035 0.0552 1.8738 
1980 0.1521 0.0552 2.7552 
1981 0.1606 0.0552 2.9089 
1982 0.1527 0.0552 2.7662 
1983 0.1613 0.0552 2.9211 
1984 0.1146 0.0552 2.0752 
1985 0.1462 0.0552 2.6485 
1986 0.1437 0.0552 2.6020 
1987 0.1544 0.0552 2.7970 
1988 0.1575 0.0552 2.8524 
1989 0.1622 0.0552 2.9380 
1990 0.1740 0.0552 3.1510 
1991 0.1581 0.0552 2.8634 
1992 0.1595 0.0552 2.8883 
1993 0.1584 0.0552 2.8691 
1994 0.1773 0.0552 3.2102 
1995 0.1613 0.0552 2.9214 
1996 0.1713 0.0552 3.1019 
1997 0.1909 0.0552 3.4578 
1998 0.1894 0.0552 3.4310 
1999 0.1593 0.0707 2.2526 
2000 0.1610 0.0552 2.9156 
2001 0.1572 0.0552 2.8463 
2002 0.1380 0.0552 2.4994 
2003 0.1442 0.0552 2.6116 
2004 0.1361 0.0552 2.4646 
2005 0.1548 0.0552 2.8031 
2006 0.1363 0.0552 2.4689 
2007 0.1323 0.0552 2.3957 
2008 0.1688 0.0552 3.0563 
2009 0.1721 0.0552 3.1174 
2010 0.1630 0.0552 2.9513 
 
Comparing the pre salary cap data to the data after 
the salary cap was implemented, but before the luxury tax 
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was implemented, yields interesting findings.  The average 
ratio for the pre salary cap data was 2.5115 with a 
variance of .3294.  The average ratio after the salary cap 
but before the luxury tax was 2.9808 with a variance of 
.0670.  The raise in the average ratio of .4693 is 
statistically significant at the .05 level, thus the 
implementation of the soft salary cap in the NBA coincided 
with a decrease in competitive balance.  This goes against 
  
Figure 4. 7 NBA Ratio of Actual to Ideal Standard Deviation of Winning % 
 
 
the goal of keeping competitive balance high in the league 
while reigning in the spending of large market teams.  The 
reason why this salary cap did not work the way the NBA had 
expected was do the number of exceptions teams could use to 
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bypass the cap level.  Since the Larry Bird exception 
allowed teams to go over the salary cap to resign their own 
players, many teams were over the cap on a year to year 
basis.  Teams also manipulated the cap by signing free 
agent players up to the cap and then signing their own 
players since they were allowed to go over.  This allowed 
the large market teams to still pay more than the small 
market teams for talent and competitive balance suffered. 
Comparing the salary cap data before the luxury tax to 
the data after both the salary cap and luxury tax were 
implemented, shows the opposite result.  As stated 
previously, the average ratio after the salary cap but 
before the luxury tax was 2.9808 with a variance of .0670.  
The average ratio after the luxury tax was implemented was 
2.6986 with a variance of .0811.  The decline in the 
average ratio of .2822, while not as large as the increase 
from the years before, is also statistically significant at 
the .05 level.  By implementing the luxury tax to further 
constrain teams’ ability to go too far over the salary cap, 
the NBA achieved the goal of bringing back a higher level 
of competitive balance in the process.  Teams still go over 
the salary cap and luxury tax threshold on a yearly basis, 
but the luxury tax money they pay is distributed to the 
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teams that do not go above the cap, creating a 
redistribution of wealth allowing lower market teams to 
keep their own players instead of having to let them go 
once their contracts expire. 
Inter-seasonal competitive balance analysis yields 
similar results for the NBA.  The average change in winning 
percentage during this time period is shown in Table 4.8 
and Figure 4.8.  The average change in winning percentage 
from season to season before the salary cap was implemented 
was .0996 with a variance of .0001, compared to an average 
change of .0914 with a variance of .0003 for the time 
period between salary cap implementation and luxury tax 
implementation.  As was the case in the intra-seasonal 
analysis, the implementation of the soft salary cap in the 
NBA looks to have lowered the competitive balance of the 
league, but this measure is not significant at the .05 
level.  The average change in winning percentage after the 
addition of the luxury tax was .1031 with a variance of 
.0004.  While this value is greater than the original 
average winning percentage change before the salary cap was 
implemented, thus showing the addition of the luxury tax 
had a positive effect on competitive balance, the increase 
is not significant at the .05 level.     
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Table 4. 8 NBA Average Change in Winning % 
Season Average Change in Winning % 
1972 0.0961 
1973 0.1105 
1974 0.0974 
1975 0.1135 
1976 0.0909 
1977 0.0989 
1978 0.0855 
1979 0.1052 
1980 0.1064 
1981 0.0964 
1982 0.1155 
1983 0.0923 
1984 0.0858 
1985 0.0923 
1986 0.0456 
1987 0.0987 
1988 0.0828 
1989 0.1129 
1990 0.1015 
1991 0.0758 
1992 0.1039 
1993 0.0895 
1994 0.0813 
1995 0.1021 
1996 0.0896 
1997 0.1118 
1998 0.1220 
1999 0.1296 
2000 0.0862 
2001 0.0706 
2002 0.1001 
2003 0.0740 
2004 0.1070 
2005 0.1409 
2006 0.0992 
2007 0.0943 
2008 0.1122 
2009 0.1033 
2010 0.1010 
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Figure 4.8 NBA Average Change in Winning % 
 
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 
The MLB data ranges from the 1990 season to the 2009 
season and is split up into three sections.  The change in 
ratio of standard deviation of winning percentages of the 
MLB during this time period is shown in Table 4.9 and 
Figure 4.9.  The 1990 to 1996 season data represents the 
league with basic revenue sharing divided equally among all 
teams in the league.  The 1997 to 2002 season data 
represents the league with increased revenue sharing 
distributed in greater amounts to the lower revenue teams.  
The 2003 to 2009 season data represents the league with 
increased revenue sharing and the addition of the luxury 
tax. 
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Table 4.9 MLB Ratio of Actual to Ideal Standard Deviation of Winning % 
Season Actual Std. Dev. Ideal Std. Dev. Ratio of Actual/Ideal 
1990 0.0559 0.0393 1.4221 
1991 0.0597 0.0393 1.5198 
1992 0.0632 0.0393 1.6097 
1993 0.0750 0.0393 1.9090 
1994 0.0683 0.0468 1.4586 
1995 0.0709 0.0417 1.7011 
1996 0.0619 0.0393 1.5748 
1997 0.0593 0.0393 1.5091 
1998 0.0833 0.0393 2.1212 
1999 0.0763 0.0393 1.9419 
2000 0.0617 0.0393 1.5712 
2001 0.0805 0.0393 2.0492 
2002 0.0915 0.0393 2.3285 
2003 0.0826 0.0393 2.1027 
2004 0.0833 0.0393 2.1201 
2005 0.0667 0.0393 1.6979 
2006 0.0622 0.0393 1.5842 
2007 0.0572 0.0393 1.4563 
2008 0.0682 0.0393 1.7362 
2009 0.0704 0.0393 1.7929 
 
Figure 4.9 MLB Ratio of Actual to Ideal Standard Deviation of Winning % 
 
From the 1990 to the 1996 season, the average ratio 
was 1.5993 with a variance of .0274.  From the 1997 to the 
2002 season, the average ratio was 1.9202 with a variance 
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of .1030.  While this gain in average ratio of .3209 is 
quite large, it is not significant at the .05 level.  The 
difference between the 1997 to 2002 average of 1.9202 and 
the average of the season from 2003 to 2009, which was 
1.7843 with a variance of .0619, shows no significance at 
the .05 level as well.  Do to the small number of years in 
each data set, and the large amount of variance in the 1997 
to 2002 data, it cannot be shown that any of the three time 
periods is significantly different than the others.  
However, when just looking at the effects of the new 
revenue sharing distribution, the difference between the 
average ratio of seasons from 1990 to 1996 and 1997 to 
2009, there are significant changes.  The average ratio 
from 1997 to 2009 was 1.8470 with a variance of .0789.  
This gain of .2477 from the average ratio of the seasons 
from 1990 to 1996 is significant at the .05 level.  
Looking at the average change in winning percentage across 
seasons shows similar results.  These changes are shown in 
Table 4.10 and Figure 4.10.  The average winning percentage 
change from the 1990 to the 1996 season was .0623 with a 
variance of .00007.  From the 1997 season to the 2002 
season, the average change in winning percentage was .0570 
with a variance of .00001.  This loss of competitive 
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balance is not significant at the .05 level.  The average 
winning percentage change from the 2003 season to the 2009 
season was .0537 with a variance of .00005, and this value 
is not significantly worse than the previous time period.  
Table 4.10 MLB Average Change in Winning % 
Season Average Change in Winning % 
1991 0.0586 
1992 0.0587 
1993 0.0778 
1994 0.0615 
1995 0.0644 
1996 0.0528 
1997 0.0554 
1998 0.0627 
1999 0.0535 
2000 0.0587 
2001 0.0572 
2002 0.0544 
2003 0.0451 
2004 0.0667 
2005 0.0485 
2006 0.0500 
2007 0.0503 
2008 0.0572 
2009 0.0579 
        
By changing the way the revenue sharing pool was 
distributed to teams by giving teams with lower revenues a 
higher percentage of the pie, the MLB was trying to lessen 
the disparities between the large and small market teams.  
By doing this, small market teams would have more money to 
spend on players and would thus be more competitive.  
However, it can be shown that this change coincided with a 
decrease in competitive balance across the league.  One 
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reason for this adverse change is that the league did not 
require the low revenue teams to use the revenue sharing 
distribution they received to increase their player costs.  
Owners had the ability to pocket the money in order to make 
a profit from year to year.  In fact, due to the fact that 
the system distributes greater amounts to teams that 
generate less revenue, there is actually a disincentive to 
fielding a successful team if an owner is looking to 
maximize profits. 
Figure 4.10 MLB Average Change in Winning %  
 
Looking at the changes to competitive balance due to 
the introduction of increased revenue sharing and a luxury 
tax showed only significant changes on the intra-seasonal 
basis.  To further understand the significant change in 
intra-seasonal competitive balance brought forth by the 
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introduction of revenue sharing and the luxury tax, the 
data was broken into two sets, American League (AL) and 
National League (NL).  While the other professional leagues 
have separate divisions or conferences, the MLB is the only 
league that has different rules in its divisions.  The 
designated hitter rule allows AL teams to use any player on 
their team to hit in place of the pitcher, whereas the NL 
teams must use the pitcher to hit.  This could create 
competitive balance differences between the AL and NL.  The 
change in ratio of standard deviation of winning 
percentages of the AL and NL from the 1990 season to the 
2009 season is shown in Table 4.11 and Figure 4.11.  
The average ratio from 1990 to 1996 for the AL was 1.5997 
with a variance of .0456.  From 1997 to 2002, the average 
ratio was 2.0202 with a variance of .2585.  As with the MLB 
as a whole, this change of .4205 is not significant at the 
.05 level.  The average from 2003 to 2009 of 1.9867 with a 
variance of .0680 was not significantly different from the 
1997 to 2002 as well.  Looking at the difference in average 
ratio between the 1990 to 1996 and 1997 to 2009 seasons 
provides the same results as the MLB as well.  The average 
ratio from 1997 to 2009 was 2.0022 with a variance of 
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.1420.  The difference between this value and the value of 
1.5997 from 1990 to 1996 is significant at the .01 level. 
Table 4.11 AL v. NL Ratio of Actual to Ideal Standard Deviation of Winning % 
Season NL Std. Dev. AL Std. Dev. Ideal Std. Dev. NL Ratio AL Ratio 
1990 0.0570 0.0571 0.0393 1.4504 1.4523 
1991 0.0613 0.0606 0.0393 1.5603 1.5433 
1992 0.0660 0.0633 0.0393 1.6805 1.6105 
1993 0.0932 0.0546 0.0393 2.3736 1.3909 
1994 0.0716 0.0676 0.0468 1.5288 1.4427 
1995 0.0597 0.0829 0.0417 1.4330 1.9891 
1996 0.0558 0.0695 0.0393 1.4216 1.7691 
1997 0.0585 0.0620 0.0393 1.4884 1.5773 
1998 0.0879 0.0810 0.0393 2.2388 2.0623 
1999 0.0791 0.0757 0.0393 2.0125 1.9275 
2000 0.0693 0.0540 0.0393 1.7642 1.3738 
2001 0.0648 0.0980 0.0393 1.6488 2.4942 
2002 0.0808 0.1055 0.0393 2.0558 2.6862 
2003 0.0700 0.0976 0.0393 1.7815 2.4838 
2004 0.0864 0.0828 0.0393 2.2002 2.1073 
2005 0.0544 0.0805 0.0393 1.3839 2.0483 
2006 0.0497 0.0740 0.0393 1.2651 1.8846 
2007 0.0486 0.0673 0.0393 1.2377 1.7124 
2008 0.0683 0.0692 0.0393 1.7383 1.7619 
2009 0.0683 0.0750 0.0393 1.7391 1.9088 
 
Figure 4.11 AL v. NL Ratio of Actual to Ideal Standard Deviation of Winning % 
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The average ratio from 1990 to 1996 for the NL was 
1.6355 with a variance of .1142.  From 1997 to 2002, the 
average ratio was 1.8681 with a variance of .0793.  As with 
the MLB as a whole, this change of .2326 is not significant 
at the .05 level.  After the introduction of the luxury 
tax, the average ratio in the NL dropped to a value below 
the original value from 1990 to 1996. The average from 2003 
to 2009 of 1.6208 with a variance of .1198, however, was 
not significantly different at a .05 level from the 1197 to 
2002 seasons.  Where the NL differs from the AL, and the 
league as a whole, is comparing the periods from 1990 to 
1996 and 1997 to 2009.  The average ratio from 1997 to 2009 
was 1.7350 with a variance of .1094.  The difference 
between this value and the value of 1.6355 from 1990 to 
1996 is not significant at any level.  Looking back at the 
league numbers after 1996, it can be seen that the 
significant drop in competitive balance happened in the AL 
while the NL saw no significant change. 
Seeing that the AL showed a decline in competitive 
balance after 1996 while the NL did not, the two leagues 
were compared across each timeframe to look for significant 
differences in ratios.  From 1990 to 1996, the AL average 
ratio of 1.5997 was not significantly different from the NL 
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ratio of 1.6355 at any level.  The same can be said for the 
period of 1997 to 2002 with the AL average ratio being 
2.0202 and the NL average ratio being 1.8681.  However, 
after the implementation of the luxury tax in 2003, the 
average ratio for the AL lowers slightly to 1.9867 while 
the average NL ratio drops to 1.6208.  The difference 
between these two values of .3659 is significant at the .05 
level.   
While both leagues were similarly competitive on an 
intra-seasonal basis before the luxury tax, the 
implementation of this tax caused the AL to have less 
competitive balance than the NL.  The purpose of the luxury 
tax was to constrain team salaries so that large market 
teams did not have the ability to sign all of the top 
talent leaving the smaller market teams with rosters that 
were not competitive.  Looking at team salaries over the 
time period from 1990-2009 provides a better view as to the 
effectiveness of the tax.  The average team salaries for 
the NL and AL are shown in Figure 4.12.  Salaries have 
increased steadily over the time period across both 
leagues, with no significant difference between the two 
leagues. 
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Table 4.12 AL v. NL Average Team Payroll 
Season NL Avg. Team Payroll AL Avg. Team Payroll  
1990 $17,861,584 $17,078,641 
1991 $24,115,560 $24,346,630 
1992 $29,911,526 $30,388,008 
1993 $28,093,792 $33,490,870 
1994 $28,977,920 $34,611,727 
1995 $28,117,057 $35,409,068 
1996 $30,374,549 $33,853,893 
1997 $35,883,730 $40,467,339 
1998 $38,026,839 $42,991,280 
1999 $47,644,404 $48,758,069 
2000 $55,383,506 $56,403,145 
2001 $63,789,107 $67,301,150 
2002 $65,776,135 $69,447,098 
2003 $72,885,009 $68,714,427 
2004 $67,780,757 $70,483,845 
2005 $70,948,009 $75,479,911 
2006 $72,377,289 $83,476,433 
2007 $73,701,648 $92,840,401 
2008 $83,097,874 $96,919,106 
2009 $85,032,308 $93,271,540 
 
Figure 4.12 AL v. NL Average Team Payroll 
 
 
The more important factor to look at is the dispersion 
of team salaries from year to year.  Figure 4.13 and Figure 
4.14 show the standard deviation of team salaries and 
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difference between highest and lowest team salary 
respectively.  
Table 4.13 AL v. NL Standard Deviation of Payroll 
Season NL Std. Dev. Payroll AL Std. Dev. Payroll  
1990 $3,200,239 $4,543,194 
1991 $5,895,771 $6,568,861 
1992 $9,037,241 $9,643,834 
1993 $9,989,955 $7,788,683 
1994 $8,729,433 $6,952,299 
1995 $8,612,214 $7,404,271 
1996 $8,543,269 $11,642,866 
1997 $11,717,656 $14,198,026 
1998 $14,159,717 $16,252,193 
1999 $19,099,895 $24,596,207 
2000 $20,719,571 $24,016,142 
2001 $22,859,530 $27,636,488 
2002 $22,227,706 $28,047,614 
2003 $22,901,881 $33,783,490 
2004 $23,793,077 $41,783,940 
2005 $20,668,276 $45,931,229 
2006 $24,596,713 $39,425,459 
2007 $26,231,520 $39,530,685 
2008 $29,262,243 $45,958,851 
2009 $31,046,213 $37,432,880 
 
Figure 4.13 AL v. NL Standard Deviation of Payroll 
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Table 4.14 AL v. NL Payroll Discrepancy 
Season NL Payroll Discrepancy AL Payroll Discrepancy 
1990 $9,090,500 $14,377,507 
1991 $21,670,664 $19,005,166 
1992 $31,000,002 $35,427,500 
1993 $34,022,167 $30,029,999 
1994 $26,972,834 $24,093,834 
1995 $33,168,000 $25,264,000 
1996 $32,519,500 $33,708,620 
1997 $41,416,834 $42,844,377 
1998 $50,334,000 $50,345,134 
1999 $59,915,000 $71,775,709 
2000 $70,505,953 $77,283,760 
2001 $74,256,453 $88,157,143 
2002 $64,149,499 $91,548,583 
2003 $76,549,429 $133,119,814 
2004 $69,132,470 $154,637,283 
2005 $63,172,821 $178,627,750 
2006 $86,086,463 $159,245,112 
2007 $84,724,663 $165,515,545 
2008 $115,981,876 $165,260,980 
2009 $112,539,987 $139,139,189 
 
Figure 4.14 AL v. NL Payroll Discrepancy 
 
Looking at these figures, it can be seen that after 
the implementation of the luxury tax, the AL showed a much 
greater dispersion of team payrolls.  In fact, four AL 
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teams, The Yankees, Red Sox, Angels, and Tigers, were the 
only teams that went over the luxury tax threshold since 
its inception in 2003.  From 2003 to 2009, the difference 
between the AL and NL in both these measures was 
statistically significant at the .01 level.  The fact that 
Major League Baseball does not enforce a hard salary cap or 
any type of team salary floor allows the above 
discrepancies to become more widespread.  Large market 
teams continue to overspend on talent while small market 
teams field young, inexpensive players until they become 
too expensive and then are traded or allowed to leave in 
free agency.     
DISCUSSION OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
A discussion of each research question and the 
corresponding data follows.  
1) Do team payroll mechanisms have an effect on competitive 
balance in professional sports?  Looking at the values 
for intra-seasonal and inter-seasonal competitive balance 
across the four professional leagues shows that the 
implementation of revenue sharing, salary caps, and 
luxury taxes can have an effect on competitive balance.  
Each league has employed a different system in trying to 
control the spending of their teams, and these mechanisms 
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have caused different changes.  In the NFL, the 
introduction of a hard salary cap brought about no 
significant change in intra-seasonal or inter-seasonal 
competitive balance, even though the inter-seasonal 
numbers showed a rise in competitive balance very near 
significance.  In the NHL, the implementation of a hard 
salary cap had the same effect of the NFL, showing no 
significant change in competitive balance in either 
direction.  The NBA implemented two changes over the 
course of the study, adding a soft salary cap and then 
luxury tax years later.  The addition of the salary cap 
caused a significant decrease in intra-seasonal 
competitive balance and no significant change in inter-
seasonal balance.  The addition of the luxury tax 
significantly raised intra-seasonal competitive balance 
levels back near their original value pre salary cap.  
Finally, the MLB showed a significant change in intra-
seasonal competitive balance after the implementation of 
a new revenue sharing system which unevenly redistributed 
revenues to the lower revenue producing teams.  Breaking 
this down by league, the American League saw an even 
greater decrease in intra-seasonal competitive balance 
over this timeframe.  The implementation of a luxury tax 
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in MLB did not have a significant effect on intra-
seasonal competitive balance for the league as a whole, 
but did cause a significant difference between the intra-
seasonal balance of the American and National Leagues 
respectively.              
2) Is one specific mechanism better at promoting competitive 
balance than others?  Looking purely at the results of 
the analysis will not provide the best answer to this 
question.  Just looking at which mechanisms showed the 
greatest positive change in their respective leagues 
would favor the leagues that started out with a lower 
competitive balance measure.  In the NFL, the 
implementation of the hard salary cap, while not showing 
a significant gain in inter-seasonal or intra-seasonal 
competitive balance was effective in maintaining the 
already high level of balance within the league.  The 
implementation of free agency in the NFL caused many 
owners to worry that player payrolls would spiral out of 
control as there was an arms race for talent.  The hard 
salary cap stopped teams from overspending and 
distributed the talent across the league.  The NHL, while 
not as balanced as the NFL on implementation of their 
hard salary cap, was also able to maintain their level of 
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competitive balance in subsequent years.  The NBA 
introduced their soft salary cap and witnessed a 
significant decrease in intra-seasonal competitive 
balance.  Teams routinely went over the cap to resign 
their own players.  The addition of the luxury tax helped 
bring these levels back as there was now a disincentive 
to overspending.  Not only did owners have to pay a 
dollar for dollar tax for every dollar over the limit, 
but this money was distributed to the teams that did not 
overspend, potentially making them more competitive.  The 
MLB implemented greater revenue sharing to help 
redistribute wealth more efficiently to the lower revenue 
producing teams.  This change lowered the values of 
intra-seasonal competitive balance across both the 
American and National Leagues.  The implementation of the 
luxury tax showed the same effects as the NBA, raising 
balance levels, although not significantly.  The luxury 
tax raised the intra-seasonal competitive balance levels 
more in the NL than the AL, which can be explained by the 
fact that many AL teams continued to spend over the tax 
threshold and were not hindered by the penalty.           
3) What aspects of the payroll mechanisms could be 
contributing to the success or failure in promoting 
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competitive balance?  The hard salary cap contributes to 
competitive balance measures by not allowing teams to 
exceed the threshold under any circumstances.  This has 
the effect of limiting the number of players that teams 
can acquire in a given year and spreading out the talent 
across the teams in the league.  The soft salary cap 
showed the greatest decline in competitive balance of any 
payroll mechanism analyzed.  This was due to the fact 
that there were many exceptions that allowed NBA teams to 
surpass the cap limit to keep their own players or sign 
other players.  The exception which had the biggest 
impact on the effectiveness of the soft cap was the Larry 
Bird exception.   This rule allowed teams to go over 
their salary cap to sign players that had been on the 
teams for a certain number of years.  The reason for this 
rule was to make sure that teams were not forced to lose 
a star player because a team with more cap space outbid 
them.  While this helped with fan loyalty and continuity, 
it allowed many teams to circumvent the cap system by 
signing other players up until they were almost to their 
cap limit and then signing their own free agents.  The 
luxury tax showed gains in competitive balance for both 
the NBA and MLB.  In leagues with no cap, the MLB, or a 
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soft cap, the NBA, it was the only measure that gave 
teams a disincentive to overspending.  The severity of 
the luxury tax in the NBA, one dollar tax for every 
dollar over the tax threshold, was the main factor in its 
success.  The luxury tax in the MLB showed less success 
in raising competitive balance due to the extreme team 
revenue disparity across the league.  The large market 
teams continued to overspend continued to overspend even 
as the percentage of tax to be paid increased with each 
successive year.  Revenue sharing was most associated 
with the luxury tax in these two leagues as it gave the 
lower spending and revenue producing teams a percentage 
of the tax.  In the NBA, teams that were under the cap 
received a percentage of the tax proceeds, while in the 
MLB, greater percentages of tax went to teams that 
produced less revenue.  In the MLB, the implementation of 
a revenue sharing plan paying more to the lower revenue 
producing teams did not have the effect the league was 
looking for.  While the proceeds helped keep small market 
teams financially stable, this did not translate into 
making them more competitive on the field.  This was due 
to the fact that the league had no team salary floor.  
The MLB is the only professional league that does not 
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have a team salary floor, and many owners choose to 
pocket their revenue rather than spend it on players.  By 
not implementing a salary floor, mainly because the 
players believed it would then lead to a salary cap, the 
goals of the luxury tax and revenue sharing were 
undermined.   
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Each payroll mechanism in the four professional sports 
leagues was implemented for a certain purpose, whether it 
is maintaining an already high level of competitive 
balance, constraining high revenue teams by forcing them to 
pay a penalty as they overspend, or allowing teams to be 
flexible with their spending in order to keep fan interest 
strong.  The results of these mechanisms, as detailed in 
the research, have been mixed.  The leagues have recognized 
the various issues with their systems and many changes are 
potentially on the horizon in each league.      
Major League Baseball is trying to solve the problem of 
low revenue teams using their revenue sharing dollars to 
cover debts rather than add talent.  The Florida Marlins 
are one of the teams in the MLB that has consistently been 
at the bottom in terms of team payroll.  Three out of the 
last four seasons, the Marlins have been last in the league 
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in payroll, and the players union has accused them of not 
complying with the terms of the League’s collective 
bargaining agreement which states that “each club shall use 
its revenue sharing receipts…in an effort to improve its 
performance on the field (Gonzalez, 2010).”  The Marlins 
contend that the low payroll is due to the fact they are 
one of the lowest revenue producing teams in the league, 
and the product put on the field, while not paid 
significantly, has over-performed over the last few 
seasons.  The Marlins are moving into a new ballpark in the 
2012 season, so the MLB has taken steps to try and 
alleviate this payroll issue.    
The League has reached an agreement with the Marlins from 
the 2010 to 2012 seasons stating that that the Marlins will 
increase player payroll annually leading up to the opening 
of their new stadium.  If the Marlins do not add to payroll 
each year, and complaints arise, the MLB is allowed to step 
in and force an arbitration hearing (Belson & Sandomir, 
2010).  These types of agreements by the league are a great 
first step in settling the issue of low payrolls in Major 
League Baseball.  As these agreements are enforced, 
competitive balance will rise as players will not only be 
signed by the large revenue teams. 
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The NBA is starting to negotiate their new collective 
bargaining agreement to avoid a lockout on July 1, 2011.  
The owners submitted an initial proposal in February of 
this year with significant changes to the current payroll 
structure.  The owners would like to decrease the players 
share of Basketball Related Income from fifty-seven percent 
to somewhere under fifty percent.  Also, in an effort to 
lower the amount of money per contract a team has to pay, 
the owners have proposed a reduction of the maximum length 
of a player’s contract from six years to five years for 
players resigning with their current team and from five 
years to four years for players signing with new teams.   
Finally, and most importantly, the owners have proposed a 
hard salary cap, like the NFL, to replace the current soft 
salary cap and luxury tax system (Berger, 2010).  Many 
owners have claimed they are losing money each season, so 
eliminating the flexibility of larger revenue teams to 
spend over the cap will also allow lower market teams to 
compete for players without overspending themselves. 
The Players’ Association has balked at the initial 
proposal of the owners stating that implementing a hard 
salary cap will eliminate the middle class of players that 
the league had previously fought hard to protect.  Teams 
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will pay the high profile players the maximum amount they 
can, leaving less to spend on the supporting players.  The 
players argue they already have guaranteed that the amount 
of team revenue spent on players cannot go over a certain 
threshold, and they also hold nine percent of their 
salaries in escrow each season.  The players have an 
argument that they have made concessions in the past, but 
the economic struggles of many of the teams could end up 
playing a strong factor in the negotiations.  The league is 
more concerned about teams being forced to disband due to 
lack of revenues than players complaining they make a few 
less million each year.  The NBA players are already the 
highest paid players of all the professional sports 
leagues, so their negotiating power will be minimal. 
While the NBA is trying to move to a hard salary cap 
system like the NFL, the NFL is making changes themselves.  
The NFL owners, in 2008, voted to opt out of the current 
collective bargaining agreement citing increases in player 
costs, stadium and construction costs, and problems with 
the rookie salary system (Clayton, 2008).  The players 
currently receive almost sixty percent of league revenues 
and increasing contracts for rookie players have exceeding 
proven veterans in many cases.  The decision by the owners 
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to opt out has brought about an uncapped 2010 season for 
the NFL.  Not only will the league operate without a salary 
cap in the upcoming season, but there will also be no 
salary floor.  DeMaurice Smith, president of the NFL 
Players’ Association, has said that once the hard salary 
cap goes away, his players will never vote to bring it 
back. (Myers, 2010)  This could bring about a system where 
high revenue teams overpay for players and lower revenue 
teams pay as little as possible, similar to issues in the 
MLB.  Under this system, league competitive balance would 
suffer and the NFL could lose their status as the most 
balanced of the four professional leagues. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Summary 
 
The purpose of the study was to analyze the effects of 
team payroll mechanisms on competitive balance in the four 
major professional sports of the Major League Baseball 
(MLB), National Basketball Association (NBA), National 
Football League (NFL), and National Hockey League (NHL).  
In analyzing these effects, the purpose was (1) to 
understand the differences between the payroll mechanisms 
of each sport, (2) to determine the effects of each payroll 
mechanism on the competitive balance of the respective 
league, and (3) to describe which aspects of each payroll 
mechanism impact the measured competitive balance of the 
leagues.   
 To analyze the measures of competitive balance, 
secondary data of team winning percentages was compiled.  
These values were broken down into categories based on the 
implementation of various team payroll mechanisms in each 
sport, including the addition of a soft salary cap and 
luxury tax in the NBA, hard salary caps in the NFL and NHL, 
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and a luxury tax and enhanced revenue sharing plan in the 
MLB.  
 Competitive balance was measured on both an intra-
seasonal and inter-seasonal basis.  Intra-seasonal 
competitive balance is the degree of equality of the teams 
in a league during a given season.  This was measured by 
the average ratio of the actual standard deviation in a 
given season and the ideal standard deviation based on the 
Central Limit Theorem.  Inter-seasonal competitive balance 
is the degree of uncertainty across seasons as to the 
playing strength of teams in a given league.  This was 
measured by the average change from season to season in 
winning percentage of the teams in each league.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
To determine whether professional team payroll 
mechanisms have an effect on competitive balance in their 
respective leagues, the following research questions were 
proposed. 
1. Do team payroll mechanisms have an effect on 
competitive balance in professional sports? 
2. Is one specific mechanism better at promoting 
competitive balance than others? 
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3. What aspects of the payroll mechanisms could be 
contributing to the success or failure in promoting 
competitive balance? 
 After reviewing the data gathered in this study, the 
following conclusions were drawn: 
1. The implementation of a hard salary cap did not 
significantly increase measures of competitive balance, but 
was successful in maintaining the current level of 
competitive balance in the NFL and NHL. 
2. The implementation of a soft salary cap in the 
NBA significantly decreased the level of intra-seasonal 
competitive balance in the league.  
3. The implementation of a luxury tax in the NBA and 
MLB had the effect of increasing intra-seasonal competitive 
balance in both leagues.  However, due to increased 
spending by AL teams in the MLB, the luxury tax caused 
intra-seasonal competitive balance in the NL to be 
significantly higher than the AL. 
4. No payroll mechanism across the four leagues had 
a significant impact on measures of inter-seasonal 
competitive balance. 
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Recommendations for Future Research 
 While the findings did show changes to competitive 
balance measures based on the implementation of certain 
payroll mechanisms, further research is warranted to 
develop a more comprehensive analysis. 
1. This research could be expanded to take into 
account the effects of other factors on competitive 
balance including team relocation, league expansion, and 
effects of the economy on the leagues. 
2. Taking into account that many of these payroll 
mechanisms were implemented relatively recently, a future 
study involving more years of post-implementation data 
would be of interest. 
3. The potential upcoming changes in many of the 
leagues payroll structures would provide a whole new set 
of data to analyze.  The effects of these changes on 
competitive balance in the leagues would also be of 
interest.   
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(cells highlighted in green denote statistical significance) 
 
Difference in Std. Dev. Ratio between NFL and MLB 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 1.506789649 1.760313378 
Variance 0.020574339 0.073158139 
Observations 33 20 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 26   
t Stat -3.87460241   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.00032391   
t Critical one-tail 1.705617901   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.000647821   
t Critical two-tail 2.055529418   
 
Difference in Std. Dev. Ratio between NFL and NHL 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 1.506789649 1.702301021 
Variance 0.020574339 0.067594068 
Observations 33 15 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 18   
t Stat -2.72976031   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.006876538   
t Critical one-tail 1.734063592   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.013753075   
t Critical two-tail 2.100922037   
 
Difference in Std. Dev. Ratio between NFL and NBA 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 2.731883237 1.506789649 
Variance 0.195025204 0.020574339 
Observations 40 33 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 49   
t Stat 16.52051793   
P(T<=t) one-tail 5.72356E-22   
t Critical one-tail 1.676550893   
P(T<=t) two-tail 1.14471E-21   
t Critical two-tail 2.009575199   
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Difference in Std. Dev. Ratio between NBA and NHL 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 2.731883237 1.702301021 
Variance 0.195025204 0.067594068 
Observations 40 15 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 43   
t Stat 10.62956769   
P(T<=t) one-tail 6.54949E-14   
t Critical one-tail 1.681070704   
P(T<=t) two-tail 1.3099E-13   
t Critical two-tail 2.016692173   
 
Difference in Std. Dev. Ratio between NBA and MLB 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 2.731883237 1.760313378 
Variance 0.195025204 0.073158139 
Observations 40 20 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 55   
t Stat 10.5174267   
P(T<=t) one-tail 4.43942E-15   
t Critical one-tail 1.673033966   
P(T<=t) two-tail 8.87885E-15   
t Critical two-tail 2.004044769   
 
Difference in Std. Dev. Ratio between NHL and MLB 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 1.702301021 1.760313378 
Variance 0.067594068 0.073158139 
Observations 15 20 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 31   
t Stat -0.642043231   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.26278244   
t Critical one-tail 1.695518742   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.525564879   
t Critical two-tail 2.039513438   
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Difference in Winning % Change between NFL and MLB 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 0.168347813 0.057436524 
Variance 0.000885419 5.47918E-05 
Observations 32 19 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 37   
t Stat 20.06540313   
P(T<=t) one-tail 8.84586E-22   
t Critical one-tail 1.687093597   
P(T<=t) two-tail 1.76917E-21   
t Critical two-tail 2.026192447   
 
Difference in Winning % Change between NFL and NHL 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 0.168347813 0.067885969 
Variance 0.000885419 8.46521E-05 
Observations 32 13 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 41   
t Stat 17.18337295   
P(T<=t) one-tail 1.21261E-20   
t Critical one-tail 1.682878003   
P(T<=t) two-tail 2.42522E-20   
t Critical two-tail 2.019540948   
 
Difference in Winning % Change between NFL and NBA 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 0.168347813 0.098014964 
Variance 0.000885419 0.00028545 
Observations 32 39 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 47   
t Stat 11.89036185   
P(T<=t) one-tail 4.49695E-16   
t Critical one-tail 1.677926722   
P(T<=t) two-tail 8.9939E-16   
t Critical two-tail 2.01174048   
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Difference in Winning % Change between NBA and NHL 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 0.098014964 0.067885969 
Variance 0.00028545 8.46521E-05 
Observations 39 13 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 39   
t Stat 8.101380189   
P(T<=t) one-tail 3.46776E-10   
t Critical one-tail 1.684875122   
P(T<=t) two-tail 6.93552E-10   
t Critical two-tail 2.022690901   
 
Difference in Winning % Change between NBA and MLB 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 0.098014964 0.057436524 
Variance 0.00028545 5.47918E-05 
Observations 39 19 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 56   
t Stat 12.70373261   
P(T<=t) one-tail 1.96719E-18   
t Critical one-tail 1.672522304   
P(T<=t) two-tail 3.93437E-18   
t Critical two-tail 2.003240704   
 
Difference in Winning % Change between NHL and MLB  
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 0.067885969 0.057436524 
Variance 8.46521E-05 5.47918E-05 
Observations 13 19 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 22   
t Stat 3.409052739   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.001258172   
t Critical one-tail 1.717144335   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.002516343   
t Critical two-tail 2.073873058   
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STATISTICAL TESTS FOR NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE INTRA-
SEASONAL AND INTER-SEASONAL COMPETITIVE BALANCE  
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(cells highlighted in green denote statistical significance) 
 
Difference in Std. Dev. Ratio Pre and Post Salary Cap 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 1.500565195 1.526972357 
Variance 0.021283695 0.018807256 
Observations 16 16 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 30   
t Stat -0.527543825   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.300848103   
t Critical one-tail 1.697260851   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.601696205   
t Critical two-tail 2.042272449   
 
Difference in Winning % Change Pre and Post Salary Cap 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 0.15982619 0.180568192 
Variance 0.000833305 0.000761326 
Observations 15 15 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 28   
t Stat -2.01171358   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.026981574   
t Critical one-tail 1.701130908   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.053963147   
t Critical two-tail 2.048407115   
 
Difference in Winning % Change Pre and Post Salary Cap 
(Most Recent Season Omitted)    
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 0.15982619 0.182577527 
Variance 0.000833305 0.00075467 
Observations 15 14 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 27   
t Stat -2.174612382   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.019295965   
t Critical one-tail 1.703288423   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.03859193   
t Critical two-tail 2.051830493   
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STATISTICAL TESTS FOR NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE INTRA-SEASONAL 
AND INTER-SEASONAL COMPETITIVE BALANCE  
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Difference in Std. Dev. Ratio Pre and Post Salary Cap 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 1.738068451 1.630766162 
Variance 0.059588885 0.092909431 
Observations 10 5 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
Df 7   
t Stat 0.684959437   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.257701087   
t Critical one-tail 1.894578604   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.515402174   
t Critical two-tail 2.364624251   
 
Difference in Winning % Change Pre and Post Salary Cap 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 0.067163202 0.069512195 
Variance 0.000103834 5.66241E-05 
Observations 9 4 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 8   
t Stat -0.46341814   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.327705765   
t Critical one-tail 1.859548033   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.655411531   
t Critical two-tail 2.306004133   
 
115 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX D 
STATISTICAL TESTS FOR NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION 
INTRA-SEASONAL AND INTER-SEASONAL COMPETITIVE BALANCE  
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(cells highlighted in green denote statistical significance) 
 
Difference in Std. Dev. Ratio Pre and Post Salary Cap 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 2.511476355 2.980847725 
Variance 0.32935694 0.066986281 
Observations 14 14 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 18   
t Stat 
-
2.789619029   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.006051431   
t Critical one-tail 1.734063592   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.012102861   
t Critical two-tail 2.100922037   
 
Difference in Std. Dev. Ratio Pre and Post Luxury Tax 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 2.980847725 2.698566031 
Variance 0.066986281 0.081120501 
Observations 14 12 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 23   
t Stat 2.627180778   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.007531517   
t Critical one-tail 1.713871517   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.015063035   
t Critical two-tail 2.068657599   
 
Difference in Winning % Change Pre and Post Salary Cap 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 0.099573394 0.091365397 
Variance 9.90164E-05 0.000319523 
Observations 13 13 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 19   
t Stat 1.446574755   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.082156332   
t Critical one-tail 1.729132792   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.164312664   
t Critical two-tail 2.09302405   
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Difference in Winning % Change Pre and Post Luxury Tax 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 0.0913654 0.1031061 
Variance 0.0003195 0.00040677 
Observations 13 13 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 24   
t Stat -1.570757   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.0646654   
t Critical one-tail 1.7108821   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.1293307   
t Critical two-tail 2.0638985   
 
118 
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STATISTICAL TESTS FOR MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL INTRA-SEASONAL AND 
INTER-SEASONAL COMPETITIVE BALANCE 
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(cells highlighted in green denote statistical significance) 
 
MLB Difference in Std. Dev. Ratio between 90-96 and 97-02 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 1.599305182 1.92015516 
Variance 0.027417663 0.10300694 
Observations 7 6 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 7   
t Stat -2.20962711   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.031415906   
t Critical one-tail 1.894578604   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.062831812   
t Critical two-tail 2.364624251   
 
MLB Difference in Std. Dev. Ratio between 97-02 and 03-09 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 1.92015516 1.78431433 
Variance 0.103006945 0.06194496 
Observations 6 7 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 9   
t Stat 0.842172076   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.210753173   
t Critical one-tail 1.833112923   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.421506346   
t Critical two-tail 2.262157158   
 
MLB Difference in Std. Dev. Ratio between 90-96 and 97-09 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 1.599305182 1.8470101 
Variance 0.027417663 0.07886008 
Observations 7 13 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 18   
t Stat -2.479161168   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.011647142   
t Critical one-tail 1.734063592   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.023294285   
t Critical two-tail 2.100922037   
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MLB Difference in Winning % Change between 91-96 and 97-02 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 0.06229304 0.056972619 
Variance 7.23262E-05 1.1369E-05 
Observations 6 6 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 7   
t Stat 1.424528939   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.098656122   
t Critical one-tail 1.894578604   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.197312243   
t Critical two-tail 2.364624251   
 
MLB Difference in Winning % Change between 97-02 and 03-09 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 0.056972619 0.053671429 
Variance 1.1369E-05 5.42898E-05 
Observations 6 7 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 9   
t Stat 1.062662146   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.157808066   
t Critical one-tail 1.833112923   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.315616132   
t Critical two-tail 2.262157158   
 
MLB Difference in Winning % Change between 91-96 and 97-09 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 0.06229304 0.055195055 
Variance 7.23262E-05 3.4816E-05 
Observations 6 13 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 7   
t Stat 1.849253737   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.053442036   
t Critical one-tail 1.894578604   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.106884073   
t Critical two-tail 2.364624251   
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NL Difference in Std. Dev. Ratio between 90-96 and 97-02 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 1.635467597 1.868084611 
Variance 0.114154345 0.079300597 
Observations 7 6 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 11   
t Stat -1.353785884   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.101482919   
t Critical one-tail 1.795884814   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.202965838   
t Critical two-tail 2.200985159   
 
NL Difference in Std. Dev. Ratio between 97-02 and 03-09 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 1.868084611 1.62083991 
Variance 0.079300597 0.119787268 
Observations 6 7 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 11   
t Stat 1.419699006   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.091704488   
t Critical one-tail 1.795884814   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.183408976   
t Critical two-tail 2.200985159   
 
NL Difference in Std. Dev. Ratio between 90-96 and 97-09 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 1.635467597 1.734952849 
Variance 0.114154345 0.109393611 
Observations 7 13 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 12   
t Stat -0.632719375   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.269393522   
t Critical one-tail 1.782287548   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.538787045   
t Critical two-tail 2.178812827   
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AL Difference in Std. Dev. Ratio between 90-96 and 97-02 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 1.59971036 2.02023 
Variance 0.045593481 0.25852 
Observations 7 6 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 7   
t Stat -1.888216673   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.050469808   
t Critical one-tail 1.894578604   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.100939616   
t Critical two-tail 2.364624251   
 
AL Difference in Std. Dev. Ratio between 97-02 and 03-09 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 2.020234525 1.98674 
Variance 0.258517531 0.06796 
Observations 6 7 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 7   
t Stat 0.145776201   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.444103549   
t Critical one-tail 1.894578604   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.888207098   
t Critical two-tail 2.364624251   
 
AL Difference in Std. Dev. Ratio between 90-96 and 97-09 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 1.59971036 2.0022 
Variance 0.045593481 0.142 
Observations 7 13 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 18   
t Stat -3.048076876   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.003460709   
t Critical one-tail 1.734063592   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.006921419   
t Critical two-tail 2.100922037   
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Difference in Std. Dev. Ratio between NL & AL   
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances   
     
  Variable 1 (NL) Variable 2 (AL) 
Mean 1.700133011 1.861327731 
Variance 0.107509589 0.142875136 
Observations 20 20 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 37   
t Stat -1.44066132   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.079044883   
t Critical one-tail 1.687093597   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.158089765   
t Critical two-tail 2.026192447   
 
Difference in Std. Dev. Ratio between NL & AL 90-96 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances   
     
  Variable 1 (NL) Variable 2 (AL) 
Mean 1.635467597 1.59971036 
Variance 0.114154345 0.045593481 
Observations 7 7 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 10   
t Stat 0.236698494   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.408834415   
t Critical one-tail 1.812461102   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.817668829   
t Critical two-tail 2.228138842   
 
Difference in Std. Dev. Ratio between NL & AL 97-02 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances   
     
  Variable 1 (NL) Variable 2 (AL) 
Mean 1.868084611 2.020234525 
Variance 0.079300597 0.258517531 
Observations 6 6 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 8   
t Stat -0.64121823   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.26965618   
t Critical one-tail 1.859548033   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.539312361   
t Critical two-tail 2.306004133   
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Difference in Std. Dev. Ratio between NL & AL 03-09 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances   
     
  Variable 1 (NL) Variable 2 (AL) 
Mean 1.62083991 1.986739278 
Variance 0.119787268 0.067961481 
Observations 7 7 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 11   
t Stat -2.234200549   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.023589043   
t Critical one-tail 1.795884814   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.047178085   
t Critical two-tail 2.200985159   
 
